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Tbm Jenkins
On 1 January 1999 EuroPe will
begin the third and final stage of,
economlc  and monetary unlon; tne
exchange rates oF the particiPating
,rr,.r' Jrrr.n.ies will 
^be 
irrevocab-iy
fixed, and, three years later, the
countries of Europe will introduce a
single currency.  The very. effort to.
meet the cnterla tor partlclPatlng In
EMU has changed  the European
economic  and financial landscaPe.
The EU Member States have
achieved  a remarkable degree of sta-
biliry which seemed  scarcely possible
just a few years ago.
Eurooet nation states have decided
to adopt a currency which they are
no longer able to create themselves.
The iniroduction ofa single curren-
cy in Europe thus goes far beYond
ti-r" ,.rl-  of ..o.tol-i.t. lr will make
the process of European unification
irreversible, forgingcloser  ties
between the societies of the various
Member States. European  monetarY
union will have implications  For a
great many areas of politics' rhe
E ono-y and everyday  life. It will
place new demands nor iust on
politicians, economists and business'
but on eu.ry single one of us.
The representatives  of.EuroPt's
socio-economic  grouPings who
make up the Economic and Social
Committee  have already been con-
fronting this challenge For a number




,nr*., ,o the glob-"al challenges
which Europe is now facing.
The permanent  study group on rhe
singli currency, t.t upby the ESC
as iarlv as 1994, was responsible for
pr.prrittg the ground fo? a series of
Committee  opinions on matters
relating to th; implementadon  ofmonetary union, including the
practical  aspecrs of the intioducrion
of a single currency, the machinerv.
rhe legJ fram.*ork and rhe eco- '
nomic and social implications.
These opinions are primarily
addressed to the insiitutions and
organizations  involved in the
implementation  of EMU, but they
are also inrended to provide  a basis
For discussion for all-the socio-eco-
nomic groupinss in the Member
SLates. There is"still a great general
need for information."For  rtis rea-
son, and in order to stimulate oub-
lic debate on the introducion bf
the euro and to reduce uncertainry,
the ESC is publishins  this brochure
setting out -any of fie opinions
which- it has issued.
Europe is increasingly having to
compere wirh orher reeions which
have made considerabii progress  in
bringing their economi.i up ro
strengtn ano Decomrng compe trve.
In thls internarional ciimare'of
competition, Europe will only be
able to susrain irs oosition if it is
willing to speak with one voice in
the field of economic  policy. We
will no longer be ableio afford to
take economic policy d66i5isnt
independently irom'one another.
Monetary  union promises ro bring
great economic  and political oppor-
tunities with relatively little risk. It
will safeguard and boosr growth
and emiloymenr in rhe Europ.un
internal market. The establishment
of monetary union will also provide
the impetus for a truly European
economic  and employment policy,
Ihqi:by helping to preserve and
build on the prosperiry  already
achieved. Thii economic impe rus
will be ofbenefit to all Europeans
in the long term.
$  p3t, of the PRINCE programme
t"he Economic and Social Commit-
tee has organized conferences on
the introduction of the euro, in col-
laborarion with rhe EC Commis-
sion and the European  Parliamenr.
In Portugal and Spain consumer
associations  participared in the
organ rzatlon of the contefences,
whilst in Italy and the UK trade
unrons actec as paftners.
This process will, of course, conrin-
ue in other Member States from
norv until when EMU becomes
Permanent.Foreword bv the president of the Section for Economrc,
Financial 
"nd 
Mott.t"ry  Questions, Giike Frerichs
Giihe Frerichs
Europe needs Monetary  Union. The
euro will herald the completion of
the Internal Market and Europe will
become a stable, uniform economic
area. The increasing globalizadon of
international markets exacerbates
the risk that monetary fragmenta-
tion could create undesirable disrup-
tion calculated to hamper growth,
employment and prosperiry  in
Europe. On the international  eco-
nomic and financial markets, a sta-
ble euro will have much greater
clout than national European cur-
rencies have today. It will be capable
of ironing out or cushioning the
adverse repercussions of massive
capital inflows or outflows on the
economv, on inflation and interest
rate trends, and on employment.
The advantages of mone tary union
therefore outweigh the risks for
businesses,  workers and consumers.
Every citizen, i.e. every worket busi-
nessman, self employed  Person' con-
sumer, tourist or investor can direct-
ly reap the benefits.
The abolition of exchange rate fluc-
tuations will remove a significant
obstacle to trade and investmenr  in
the European economic area. For
small and medium sized businesses
in particular, which in recent years
have been more successful in job
creation  than large undertakings,
irritating, expensive currency risk
guarantee  costs will disappear,  mak-ing more funds available for tnvest-
ment. Planning for investment and
intra European trade will also be
safer. Monetary union and the single
market will combine to improve the
distribution of labour and to boost
productiviry in Europe; this in turn
will create additional pot€ntial for
growth and employment. The single
currency will make it easier to com-
pare prices throughout  the Union
and to create an area with total price
uansParency.
Close economic  policy coordination
is a prerequisite for solving employ-
ment problems in Europe. All previ-
ous attempts on the basis of PurelY
national fiscal policy have failed.
Monetary union will compel Europe
to coordinate  its economic  policy
closely and will be an important cat-
alyst for a genuine European eco-
nomic and employment policy. The
level of economic  convergence
which EU Member States have
achieved in the run up to monetary
union is extremely encouraging,
especially since only a few years ago,
many experts wefe scePtical about
the feasibility of achieving conver-
gence on such a scale.
The EMU area will become the
world's largest economic  force in
terms of GDP and external trade.
Monetary  union will give Europe an
economic boost whose impact will
be felt far beyond the boundaries of
our continent.
,---, 
-' \7--  Y-^Foreword by the president of the Permanent Study Group
on the Introduction  of the Single Currenry, Jorge Stecher Navarra
Jorge Stecher  Nauarra
The study group that I have becn ;rroud
to cl.rair for more than two years has
treen working intcnsively on preparing
opinions  in an effofi to coopcrate with
thc European  Commission  on the transi,
tion towards thc single currency.  Now
we can say that as of 1 January 1999, the
euro will be the sole legal tender in the
H,uropcan  Union and that national notes
and coins in circulation  will be expressed
as rounded fractions of the new Euro-
pean currency.  Legal provisions have also
been drawn up to ensurc that contracts
established in national currencies will be
valid in etrlos. To errrrrr. (onlinuiry  in
the main financial markcts, other non-
European  countries have also accepted
these provisions.  All of this means that
nroretary union will nt,t be,r prrrcly
European  phcnomenon,  but rathcr an
historic dcvelopment in the world mone,
tary systcm.
Up to now, world currencies have
offbred no real alternative to thc dollar.
In future, and againsr the backdrop of
thc globalization ofthe capital markets,
this will no longer be the case. 'I'he curo
will rcplacc  Lhe dollar  as rhe invoicing
currcncy .-,f many transacrions  in inter-
national  trade,  as the reserve currency of
central banks and as the preferred cur-
rency ofworld-wide investors.  In the
near Fumre, it is not unlikely that the re
will be three spheres of influence made
up of thc dollar, the yen and the euro, as
the euro rvill undoubtedly  attract the
countries of central and eastern Europe,
the Middlc H,ast and North Africa. All of
this could mean greater stabiliry  for the
global economy and financial markets,
ensuring that the European l)nion is an
equal player in the globalized  world
economy.
'I'he increasing  compeddon berween
banks and financial  systems  in genelal
will lead to more effective  use of avail-
ablc rcsources  and will hoosr invesrmenr.
As a result,  new jobs will be generated.
Lastlv, it must be said that the euro, sup-
ported by a European Union with
hcalthy finances, low inflation,  low
interest rates and an independent  central
bank, will deserve the confidence of the
markets  and will be a stable and strong
currency.
["*<Opinion  adopted  on 3l October 1996
Foreword
1.1. As the dates laid down by the
Tleaw fbr the comoletion of EMU
approach, prepa.atory  work is forging
ahead in l number  ofareas requiring
action bv the Eurooean authorities. In
accordance with the programme  marked
out by the Green Paper on the practical
arransements for the introduction of the
sirrgle-cu rrerrcy', the Commission - in
agreement with the European Monetary
Instirure (F-MI) - is preparing  a dralt
Council Regulat ion establishing the
legal infrastructure  for the use of the
Eiro. 'l he Commission\  work should be
completed  by the end of 1996.
1.2. The present Committee Opinion
follows on from the Opinion adopted
in October 1995 on the Creen Paper
on rhe pracrical arrangernents  ltor ihe
introducdon of the single currency' and
the own-initiative Opinion adopted  in
Serrtember 1996 on the Imrract of Eco-
nomic and Monetary Unioir: economrc
and social aspects oF convergence and
measures to lncrcasc awarcness or tne
single currency' . Quite aprrt lrom lor-
mal considerations, the Economic and
Social Committee  considers it to bc its
function and duw to collaborate  with
the drawing up oi draft legislation
which should not only meet the need
to create  a sound legal Framework for
the single 
".rr..,r"y, 
f,.rt is alst, .cspt,l-
sive to market  requirements. Above all,
the transition must be kept as straight-
forwar.l  as pt-rssible,  free <-rf burcaucratic
and procedural obstacles and, as far as
possible, compatible with the usagcs
and customs oF each market.
1.3. No official docume nts have yet
been oublished  bv either the Cornmis-
\lon Or Ine F r\l l.  | Ile VteWS ernre.red bV
the Commitrec  therelorc rclerio th.
working. and discussion.  papers which are
Progresslvely emergng ln vaflous qlrar-
I  (lONl(95)  333 of3l May  1995
2  OJ No. C 18 of22  January  1996, p. 112
3  CES t089/96 of26 Scptcmbcr 1996
oters. The latest Commission document
on which these comments  are based  is
dated,27 July; subsequent  changes have
been taken into consideration  subject to
the working time available  and the con-
straints of ESC procedure.
2.  General  comments
2.1. The legal basis of the Regula-
tion is not yet clear. It is in the Com-
mittee's view important that the rules
should come into force within the time
limits set and should apply to dl the
Member States,  whether or nor partici-
pating in EMU.
2.2. The Committee  is pleased to
note that many of the proposals  made
in its Opinion of October 1995 have
been taken uo in the Commissiont
preliminary  work; it notes, on the
other hand, that certain aspects of con-
siderable imoortance - which will be
recalled in the present Opinion - do
not appear to have been taken inro
consrcefauon.
2.3.  One of the aspects  highlighted
by the Commitfee  concerned contracts
drawn up between residents of Single
Currency countries and residents of
derogation countries  and berween resi-
denrs of Single Currency countries,
and residents of derogation countries
and bewveen residents of Single Cur-
rency countries  and residents of third
countries  which are governed by the
legislation  of derogation or third coun-
trLs". ,Such .on,rrir. include issues of
securities and rates of return on fixed-
interest securities,  particularly  when
ouoted on the srock exchanses  of third
Jo,rntri... The Committee  fr'ad asked
the Commission and the IME 'to
establish official contacts in order to
obtain assurances that in connection
with observance of contractual  rules
the introduction  of the Single Curren-
cv will not lead to anv disturbances  on
Eutop."n and third-iountry  markets".
2.4. The Committee is pleased to
note that this suqgestion has been
acceoted. ar least"is far as the securities
and monetary  markets are concerned,
Commission  contacts with the Interna-
tional Primary Market Association
(IPMA) and the International Swaps
and Derivatives  fusociation (ISDA) are
preparing the ground,for the Forth-
comlng declsron to otttclal ly accept
converiion from the ECU to the Euro
at a one-for-one  rate. Further  steps,
probably in relation to rhird country
eov.rrr-.t t. and/or the tVorld Tiade
e)rganization (\7TO), will also be nec-
essaw to ensure contrnulty ot contracts
conciuded with residents bf third
countries.
2.5.  Clearly,  no national or Euro-
pean legislation *  f"",. extra-territo-
rial scooe. lt rs nevertheless  essential
for economic operators  dealing with
rhird countries ro have the certainry
that both the ready acceptance  of the
Euro and the validity and continuity
of contracts will be guaranteed. lt
should be noted in tfiis.eso..t that
while international law recbgnizes  the
right of countries to chanqe the value
arid denomination  of theii currency,
the automatic recoqnition  of the right
- appllcaDle efga omnes - to legrsHte
on conversron  rates between cutterent
currencies is less clear.
4  Op.cir, (foo rn ote 2), paragraphs  7 .4., 7 .5. and'
7.6. Conrracrs  bet-ein reiidints ofsingle  Cur-
rency countries  and dcromtion counrrieis should
nor cause such problemsisince  rhe Council  Reg-
ulation will deallv  be valid for atl EU countriei
without distinction.
l0
:.r.::]r. ,:i:,,i]:,1,..l,,i3.  Replacing  the ECU and
national currencies with the Euro
3.1. The Reeulation will confirm the
decisions alrealv taken bv the Council:
with effect from t ;aouaiy 1999, the
Euro will become the currency of the
participating  Member States, and the
national currencies  with their subdivi-
sions will become fractions of the single
currencv, at conversion rates to be
determined.  The Euro currency unit
will be subdivided into hundredths.
This arrangement  permirs automatic
equivalence between the Euro and the
participating  currencies. Other provi-
sions. which have alreadv been made
known and require no particular  com-
ment, concern:
-  the choice of the Euro as the unit of
account of the Eurooean  Central
Bank (ECB) and of the parricipating
curfencles:
-  replacement  of reference (explicit  or
iniplicit) to the ECU by reference  to
the Euro in all legal instruments5, it
remaining confirmed  that the con-
version  rate will be Euro 1 for
ECU I.
3.2. With respect to continuity of
contracts, the Council Regulation
endorses the principle that introducing
the Euro cannot have the effect of mod-
ifoine the terms oF contracts,  or oF enti-
tling"one of the parties to change them
or to withdraw from the contract.
4.  Provisions applicable during
the transitional period
4.1. The Reeulation introduces the
concept of a "iansitional period", cor-
responding  to the Green Paper's "Phase
B", or "the third stage" in the words oF
the Tieat'; this would in practice  be
the three vear oeriod between the date
of effective .orir-.t""-..rt of EMU
(l January 1999) until the day before
the date of the final switch to the single
currency (31 December  2001).
4.2. Under one approach which had
begun to emerge, but now appears to
have been abandoned,  the third stage
could be shorter if circumrt"nces pir-
mit. The Committee  considered this
possibility - already discussed in the
^Green Papet - and expressed its firm
opposition- to any variation in the
.it"bli.h.d programmes. The length of
the various  stages should be decided by
the Council by 30 June 1998 at the lac
esu the decision  should also establish
that it will not be subject to subse-
quent modification. The market needs
6
7
Panicularly worthy of note is the intenuon  to
define  the concept  of "legal instrumenr':  laws, reg-
ulations, administrative decisions, court rulings,
contracts,  payment instruments  other than ban-
knotes and coins,  and other instruments  with lcgal
effect.
Article l09J(4)
Op.cit. (footnote 2), paragraphs 5.1.2. and 5.3.2.certainty  in order to programme the
numerous,  complex and costly changes
which will become necessary.
4.3. The reasons for considering the
possibiliry of reducing the length of the
third sraqe are clear. This period was
dictatedlv  the time requiied for rhe
central banks to ot.rt ,r.ir banknotes
and coins into ciiculation. It would
appear that deadlines could be short-
ened if the central banks are able to
speed up their preparations. The mar-
ket could possibly adjust to a short
period (although this is pure conjec-
ture). but onlv on the condition that
once its duration  has been decided,  no
further changes are possible.
4.4.  One of the more noteworthy
transitional  orovisions  is that the Euro
will be subdivided, in accordance  with
the conversion  rates, into national cur-
renry units, which will retain the pre-
sent subdivisions.  The monetary laws of
the individual countries will remain in
force, in tandem with the provisions  of
the Council Regulation.  These rules
require no particular comment.
4.5. The ho compubion,  no probibi-
tion" nlle
4.5.1. The Green Paper indicated that
the use of the Euro for current market
purposes during the transitional  period
should be optional. The Committee
stressed  that this principle should be
adopted without exception,  highlight-
mg mat every contractrng Pafty
lshould be given] the option ro accepr
payment in currency  other than nation-
al currency''. It was accepted  by the
Madrid Council that the market should
be free to decide, summed  up in the
expression 'ho obligation,  ni prohibi-
rrbz". No document or communication
aPpeafs ro question rhis.
4.5.2. The Regulation would, at first
sight, appear r; be based on this view.
TLe baiic rule establishes  thar leeal
instruments stipulating the use oT the
nadonal currency or the Euro must
effectively be executed in the currency
selected in advance, except where
agreed otherwise by the conrracting
p"arties. In other words, it will be u-p to
the parties to decide in which currency
the contract will be executed.  The
Committee lully supports rhis measure,
which ir had itself called for.
4.5.3. As it currently  stands, the draft
Regulation provides  for a deroga.tion:
any debt payable  by a credit for
account of the creditor, and expressed
in Euro or a national  currency, may be
dischareed in either of the two curren-
cies, at'the debtor's choice. The creditor
will receive payment in the currency of
his own 
"""irr'nr. 
with conversion at the
fixed rates.
4.5.4. This "derogation'  is clearly of
such a scope as to become the guiding
rule. Althoueh absurd, the derosation
would concein, if anyrhing, onl| cash
transactions: in effect it is irrelevant,
since as there are as yet no Euro ban-
knotes, these transactions  can only be
settled in a national currency. The ho
compubion,  no prohibition" principle is
in oractice abandoned  in favour of the
opposite principle: "choice for the
dzbto4 compabion  for the creditor".
4.5.5.I1 the aboue principle is finally
adopred, the dispute whiih will arisi in
the event that the creditor is unable to
accept a payment  in Euros will have to
be settled by the courts. One example
would be that of retailers and service
providers, conlronted with a request to
settle credit card oavments in Euros
eflected *ith , .rldit to the seller's
account. If their terminals and paymentfacilities  were nor yer in a Dosirion  ro
deal with the new curr.n"y, o, .o op..-
are in rwo currencies, such transactions
would become impossible.
4.5.6. In genera.l  rerms, the option
extended to creditors  means, from the
outset, an obligation upon companies
and in particular  the banking and
financial secror to carry out innumer-
able conversions  or to pracrice double-
entry accounting  throughout  the peri-
od, something rhe Green Paper irselF
considered technically and economically
inadvisable.
4.5.7 . ^lhe underlying reasons for the
rule in question are perfectly valid; it is
only rhe wording which appears clumsy
and should be redrafted.  [t has been
realiznd,  in examining the actual situa-
tion - ascerrained by the Commission
in the course oF irs numerous meetings
with businesses - that the market can
only adjust to the Single Currency
gradually; accounting in rwo currencies
is costly and often - especially at the
beginning of the period - completely
impracticable. The rule is intended to
take accounr of this fact, bur irs conse-
quences may oursrrip its inrenrions.
4.5.8. In the light of the above, the
Commitree  suggesrs  deleting the rule
reFerred to in point 4.5.3 above and
replacing it with another providing
that monetary  debts payable by a cred-
it for account of the creditor mav be
discharged  by the debtor in either
Euros or national currency,  subject to
the agreement  of the creditor and of
the financial institution where the
account is held. This is the onlv wav
for the .no 
compulsion,  no prohibi-'
tion' principle - which should apply to
all operators ' to be upheld; it also
accords with actual practice.
4.6. The organized markets
4.6.1.'fhe gradual  shifr to the single
currency entails planning internal tech-
nrcal an(t lrsa|l""trolfl.  measufes  on
the part of rhe tinancial  institurions.  It
should also be borne in mind that the
financial  sector works in a closely inter-
dependent fashion: each insrirution
conducts its relations with the others in
accordance  with clearly-established
rules, which are essential  to the secror's
operation. The legislation under exami-
nation takes account ofthe concept of
'brganized markets"  and lays down the
rules needed to avoid disruprion durins
the swirch-over from rhe narionai ro th-e
single currenry.
4.6.2. The Reeulation understands
'brganized -ik"tr"  to be markets set
up for swaps, clearance  or settlement  of
the financial  instrumenrs listed in Sec-
rion B o[ the Annex to Direc-
rive 93/22lEEC on investmenr  services,
and including swaps, clearance  and set-
flement ot Payment  rnstfuments.
4.6.3. k will be in the clear interests of
all organized markets to move fo the
single currency as rapidly as possible,
altliough at the same time, they will
have to take account of the caoaciw  oF
their individual members ro adiust'tothe new rules in an ordered and, most
importantly,  coordinated way. \With a
view to this reouirement, the Council
Reeulation  would provide an arrange-
*e"nt wherebv the Member States will
be able to take appropriate measures to
allow the organized markets to take
the necessar! decisions  for the
chanseover from the national to the
slngle currency.
4.6.4. The Committee  fully supports
this measure which reflects the neces-
sary pragmadsm  and an acknowledge-
meni oflhe circumstances in which
each national orqanized market oper-
ates. This fails to"resolve, howevei the
question  oF international organized
markets whose operaring base is located
in a Member Staie - noi necessarilv  par-




Srares, wherheior  not participating  in
EMU. The Committee  calls for spicific
rules to be devised to cover this aspect'
4.6.5. The Committee  believes that:
.  the rules adopted  by a market regu-
lated by p.ovisio.t, made by the "
Membir'State in which it is based
apply to all its members , whetlter or
not residcnt in the European Union;
.  where an organized market is based
in a country-not  parricipating  in
EMU, but whose members are
based in participating  countries, the
Member  .State in question should
avoid adopting  measures which
would hamoei volunrary  use oF the
ruro,
4.7.  Legal measures  to be adopted by
the Member  States
4.7 .1. The Reeulation under discussion
apparently  int;nds to leave Member
Si"t.s broad freedom of action in rela-
tion to their own markets. Allowance
for national requirements should' how-
ever, be tempered by compliance with
the common principles which are need-
ed for a harmonized  changeover  in the
various countries.  The Committee
endorses  this approach,  but at the same
time would draw attention to the need
- already alluded to in paragraph 4.5.2,
also to iake explicit account of cases
where national rules misht affect insti-
tutions or organized mikets of other
Member  States.
4.7 .2. One general rule is thar national
regulations irust comply wirh the
tiiretable to be drawn up bv the Coun-
cil. In the Committee's view this rule is
necessary but probably not sufficient:  a
d.n..e o? cooriination  oF acrions will
be"essential  if excessive  discrepancies  in
implementing the measures adopted in
each country are to be avoided.
4.7.3. Theneed for coordination dis-
cussed above  becomes  all rhe more evi-
dent given that the Member  States will
have to take the necessary measures to
redenominate  qovernment stock in cir-
culation.  More6ver, the Member  States
will have to allow the bodies directing
the organized  markets to take the deci-
sions iecessary for the adoption  of the
Euro as the unit of account. Here also,
excessive  discrepancies in implementa-
tion periods foi these measures in dif-
fereni countries and markets could
unsettle  the markets.
4.7.4. National legal provisions permit-
ting or imposing "llting 
or other.pro-
cedures of similar effect must apply to
money liabilities  expressed in Euros or
national currency. Conversion will be
carried out on the basis of the parities
ser. The same applies to the Presenta-
tion of company accounts.  These rules
conform to Treary rules and require no
speclal comment.4.7 .5. lt has also been confirmed  that
national banknotes and coins will
retain their capaciry as a legal means of
payment  only within currenr national
boundaries,  remaining  sub jecr to the
national monerary leglslation of the
counrry in quesrion. The Committee
notes rhe decision,  which is in compli-
ance wirh rhe Tieary.
5.  Rounding-offwhenconvefting
5.1.  One basic rule to be laid down
by the Requlation is rhe number of
decimal fi"gures to be used in converr-
ing. The Commission  seems to be lean-
ing towards the following conversion
rules:
a. the conversion rates will be calculat-
ed to six significant figures, and will
not be subiecr to rounding-ofi
b. the monetary  arnounts  to be paid or
calculated when converting a'
national currency to EuroJwill be
rounded off to the nearest hun-
dredth; for conversion  from Euros
to national currency, rounding-off
will be ro the neareit  decimal"sub-
division or unit, depending on
national praccice. Ilapplici'tion  of
the rule resulrs in an iiactly half-
way figure, rhe sum will be rounded
up to the nearesr hundredrh  or unit,
as appropriate.
5. | .l. These ruies are simple and Follow
earlier practice  and logic, particularly
decimalization of rhe 
"pound 
sredine.
Various problems in tirms of law aid
application arise, some of which are
already being examined  by the Com-
mission and the EMI.
5.2. It should be explicitly established
- however obvious it mav bL - that in
the case of companies, especially finan-
cial institutions, rhe applicable  rule is
that each individual  amount shall be
converred  using calculations based on
six significant Egures and rounded off
in accordance  with rhe procedures set
out in paragraph  4.7 .l b. above. ln rhis
case, the total of the numerous  arnounts
in national cunencT, converted  into
Euros, may not correspond  precisely to
the total in Euros of the individuai
amounts converted. Several tens of sam,
ple calculations have confirmed,  rhe laut
of large numbers:  for practical purposes.
the differences  are negl igible,'*ith
rounding-up or -down balancing each
other,
5.3. It follows that use of six signifi-
cant figures followed by rounding-off,
in accordance  with the rules provlded,
entails neither appreciable  losses nor
gains. In other words, the conversion
rules are "neutral"  as far as markets and
individual operators are concerned. The
Commimee  rupport.  the uniform adop-
tion of these rules for all the Member'
States.
5.4. It should however be borne in
mind that many organized markers may
rapidly adopt r[.'e E"uro as rheir currency
of account while enabling rheir mem-
bers to keep rhe national"cu rrency in
their dealings with their own business
partners. In this case, the amounts cal-
culated in national currency will be
converted into Euros by rhe organized
market and then reconverted  inio
national currency for rhe purposes oF
recording paymenr  or clearing (ransac-
tions. Matters are further comolicated
when inward and outward sums are in
rwo different  currencies, both partici-
patinq in EM U. If rhe sysrem  is to
work,-it  is essential in rhe inreresrs of
accounting correspondence,  thar exacrly
the same sum is calculated  inwards andourwards. This correspondence  is prac-
ticallv impossible to iecure' particularly
if the sums in question are considerable
(see point A ofihe Appendix).
5.5. The Committee  is of the view
that uniform rules must be adopted  to
ensure accounting €reement of trans-
actions. The orea.tired markets shouid
therefore be leFi free to establish rules
in this field; these rules would be valid
for all their members. Alternatively,
they should be drawn uP bY the Coun-
cil hegulation  although this solurion
*oulJrrot be simple ro Put into Prac-
tice since it could nor take account ol
the varvins features and wide range of
.r..d, of tf,. national and internaiional
organized markets.
5.6. A point of considerable impor-
tance needs to be made at this juncture:
oDerations using six siqnificant  figures
aid tounding-Jff operitions are ieadily
executed  by iuitably programmed com-
puters and personal compurers  (PCs)'
t,,t not bv iesk calculators with either
prinre., o, digital displays, by cash reg.
isters with built-in conversion  pro-
grammes, or by pocket calculators: the
iimjted nu-bit oF digits (usually  no
more than twelve)  they can disPlaY
rules out any calculation. This means
that those operators nor equipped  with
electronic  data processors or PCs will
have to replace their existing equip--
ment, which cannot be adjusted to the
new requirements, with entirely new
equipment. The same applies to con-
sumers wlshlng to chect( wnetner Prlces
correspond with ordinary  pocket calcu-
lators.
5.7 .  Replace ment of desk calculators,
cash regisiers and pocket  calculators
with m-odels in lini wirh the new
requirements  could represent a new
worthwhile market lor manufacturers.
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There is no way of knowing how many
such items 
".. 
itt ,tt., but sime tens of
millions seems  a reasonable  estimate.
On the other hand, replacement  costs
would constitute an additional cost of
switching to the single curre.ncy For the
market and for individuals,  the rotal
amount ofwhich would be far from
negligible.
t.S. The above comments raise prob-
lems which the legislaror cannot ignore
or underestimate.  Consumers, as well
as retailers and service providers,  need
clear, readily implemented  and moni-
tored rules,'based on criteria of equity
for both Darties. Adherence  to the "six
significant  figures" rule, with the conse-
qi.nr roundlng-off, is clearly not avail-
able to all. Theie is a real risk of pro-
voking public resistance to the Single
Currencv  at a rime when current and
planned campaigns seek to obtain the
ieverse. The Committee urges carefui
consideration of these needs and the
adoprion of rules appropriate to market
requiremenrs  (see point-B olt rhe
Appendix).
5.9. The Council Regulation should
therefore  include a specific  reference  to
retai.l trade and seruices;  acting on the
basis of the principle of subsidiariry, the
Member Staies should then devise
appropriate  simplified  rules for con-
verting their currencies into Euros.
5.10. A further comment is required
concerning conversion between partici-
pating cur-rencies:  under TrearY
Anlcli to9 I(4), rhe Council will estab-
lish only the conversion  rate into Euros
lror each individual parr icipating  curren-
cy, but not the rate for converting  each
o? them into each other one. The Regu-
lation orovides that this converslon
shall be carried out on the basis of an
algorithm comprising  the conversion ofthe original sum into Euros, with at
least three decimal figures, and the
reconversion  of the litter sum into the
other national currency. Given that the
conversion  rates of the national curren-
cies are fixed, whv should not the
Council itself - oi the ECB, by appro-
priate delegation  - set and impos-ihe
conversion  rates berween the various
currencies, calculated on the basis of
the algorithm mendoned above?
6.  Banknotes  and coins in Euros
6.1. Legal tender in Euros arrd
national currencies
6.1.1. The Regulation provides that
banknotes in Euros shall be issued - or
rather, put into circulation - at the end
of the transitional period by the ECB
and the central banks of the parricipat-
ing countries.  According  to the Regula-
tion, these notes should be the only
legal tender in the counrries in ques-
tion. The same rules would apply to
coins, subject to the reservation that
no-one could be obliged to accepr  more
than fifiy coins for any single paymenr.
6.1.2. The draft Regulation's  Final Pro-
visions establish that national ban-
knotes and coins would cease to be
legal tender six months after the end of
the transitional period. This period
could be made shorter in each Member
Stare rhrough narional legislat  ion.
6.1.3. The fact that banknotes  and
coins in Euros will be legal tender with
effect from the end of the transitional
period - in fact, I Janaary  2002 - and
that national banknotes  and coins will
cease to be legal tender six monrhs later
- 30 June 2002 - means that for a max-
imum of six months (or possibly  less in
some countries) legal tender will be
expressed  in two different ways: rhe
Euro for all participating  countries, and
the relevant national currency - a subdi-
vision of the Euro, see paragraph 3.l. -
valid only in the country ofissue.
6.1.4. Although the situation  oudined
in the previous  paragraph  is from the
Iegal poinr of view quite unexceprion-
able, in practice the public would tend
to regard the Euro and the national cur-
rency as two separate  lega,l tender cur-
rencies. There are some precedents: the
Scottish  pound, the Belgian franc and
the Luxembourg franc, but with the
difference that rhese currencies contin-ue to circulate without a cut-offdate.ln
order to avoid disturbance,  the market
should  be clearly informed that the two
currencies are of equal legal value.
There should thus be no rush to central
banla and commercial banks during
the first days of issue by members of
the public wishing to change national
currency  into Euros immediatefi. Nl
countries  have successfirl experience of
exchanging new models of national
banknotes  and coins for rypes which
are being withdrawn from circulation.
6.2. Forgery and counterfeiting
6.2.1.ln accordance  with one develop-
ing line of thought, the Council Regu-
lation would restrict itself to obliging
the Member States to provide  appro-
priate sanctions  aga.inst forgery and
counterfeiting of banknotes.  The
Committee would point out, in this
regard, that point 136 of the Green
Paper stated that "it would fall to the
Commission in coniunction with the
ESCB (European  System of Central..
Banks) to make legislative proposals
[on] the legal protection  of banknotes
against  counterfeiting". Both the Green
Paper and, apparently, the Council
Regulation, have however omitted to
consider that the placing in circulation
of counterfeit  money should also be
covered  by the law.
6.2.2. lt has therefore  been seen that
the necessary  protection  of a shared
asset, the single currenry, could not be
left to the initiative of the individual
Member States. Although criminal law
is the exclusive  preserve of the Member
States, equally  the common interest
cannot be protected in different ways
from country to country. The princi-
ole o[ subsidiariw cannot  be invoked
^h.r.. ,ro, even in terms of the criminal
law argument.
6.2.3. The Economic and Social Com-
mittee considers it essential  that the
Commission  and Council devise  a
legally valid solution to e*tend ade-
quate protection to the single currenry
through measures which all the partici-
pating Member  States will be obliged to
adoot. Purelv "national" solutions
*or.tld no, be enough and could even
prove counterproductive:  countries
*i,h 'toft.t" laws would become a
haven for counterfeiters and their dis-
tributors.
6.2.4. The Committee proposed  a solu-
tion in its Opinion on the Green Paper
(paragraphs 7:10 to 7 '14), which it
here reiterates: the adoption  of an inno-
vative and politically acceptable
approach by all the Member  States.
Measures  to counter forgery and coun-
terfeiting  of the single currency should
be considered  as an element in the fight
against organized crime: in effect, the
same approach  as was adopted with the
money laundering directive. The Com-
mittee highlighted a fact which is well-
known to all the police Forces of the
world:  these ofFences  are never commit-
ted by isolated individuals. The forgery
and counterfeiting (together with circu-
lation) of bank notes - and coins - is a
monopoly  of criminal organizations,
almost always  international,  with
impressive resources at their disposal,
which are frequently  connected with
other organizations  involved in drug
trafficking and money laundering.6.2.5. -fhe Committee  also proposed
that the new legislation should be of
comprehensive scope, and cover means
of payrnent which substitute  or consti-
tute money (payment cards, pre-paid
cards, travellers' cheques,  etc.). These
means now account for a considerable
proportion of the currency in circula-
tion, and their acceptance  depends
entirely on the confdence which the
public places in them. They too are
helping to give new strength to the
international criminal gangs. Although
the sanctions for offences against pri-
vate assets cannot be the same as those
for offences against  public assets, both
types of offence  have the same impact
on society - namely a growing threat
to the common good and a strength-
ening of organized crime.
Brussels, 31 October 1996.
The President
of the




Economic and Social Committee
Adriano GraziosiAPPENDIX
A.  Ref. Paragraph 5'4.
A simple example would be thar o[ a
relarively  modest amount in Belgian
lfancs.
Assuming that the conversion  rate ts
fixed at Euro 1 = BEF 38.7747, calcula-
tion the other way eives BEF I00 =
F,uro 2.57900.  BEF" l0 million would
be the equivalent  of Euro 217'900'00;
applying'the _fixed conuersion  rate of
38.7747 to this sum Produces
BEF 9,999,995.10'  The difference  -
BEF 4.90 over 10 million - is minimal
but becomes sisnificant  qiven rhat the
sums involved  6n the mJnerary and
financial markets are enormous. In any
case, the imporrant point is accounting
corresoondence, which demands that
the figures tally precisely.
B.  Ref. Paragraph  5.8.
This can be illustrated with two exam-
ples, based on the notional Belgian
franc parity used in point A:
.  amounts in BEF to be converted
into Euros, five decimal figures
(2.57900):
BEF 1,050 =Elul.o27.0795 - round-
ed up to 27.08
BEF 2,680 = Euro 69 '1172 - round-
ed up to 69.12
.  amounts in BEF to be converted
into Euros, two decimal figures
rounded up (2.58):
BEF 1,050 =Euro27'09
BEF 2,680 = Euo 69'74
The differences between the amounts
rounded up under the two methods
range From 0.03olo and 0.04o/o, practi-
calli meaningless from the inflationary
angre.Michael Geuenich  (Germany - 'Sforkers)
Opinion  adopted  on 26 September  1996
l.  Preliminary comments
1. I .  Following  a requesr  from the
Commission,  the Economic and Social
Committee,  adopted  an Opinion on 26
October 1995t , on t/te Green Paper on
rhe prattiul  arrangements  for thi intro-
duction of the single cunenqP. The pre-
sent Opinion should be regarded as
complementary to the latter Opinion in
which the ESC considered  the technical
problems of introducing the single cur-
rency. In the Dresent ESC will look in
greaier detail at the consequences  of a
single currenry, going beyond the prac-
Ucal Problems ol Is lnrroductron.
1.2. The ESC welcomes the olanned
introducrion of monetary union in
Europe. This has been made clear on a
number of occasions.  The ESC notes
with concern,  however, that as the
deadline for entry ro rhe rhird srage of
Economic and Monetary  Union
(EMU) draws closer, more and more
questions  are being raised by the public.
Many Europeans regard renunciation of
their national currency as a high price
to pay, even if the ultimate objective,
which enjoys general support, is closer
European  integration. The high degree
of scepticism in some quarters can be
attributed, inter alia, ro a conrinuinq
lack of publicly available informarion.
Agains.t this background the ESC con-
srcers rr aPpropflare  ro stress once
again, at the beginning of this Opinion,
the advantages of EMU for the prosper-
ity of Europet citizens.
1.2.1. The most imporranr aspect of
EMU is the disappearance  of exchange-
r  oJ c 18,22.r.1996.
2  COM(95)  333 final,31.5.1995.rate fluctuations. This will remove a
maior barrier to trade and investment
in the European Union. In this connec-
tion, the ESC endorses  the analysis pro-
vided in the Commission document',
"The lmpact of Currenry Flucruations
on the Internal Market", particularly  its
conclusion that the single currency,  as
the indispensable complement to the
single market, will:
.  eliminate internal  currency  fluctua-
tions, which are a source of maior
economic  problems;
.  make possible greater  convergence
using ih. machtinery provided for by
the EC Tleaty.
|.2.2. In addition, the forecast growth
in investment should be accompanied
by a more efficient  and rational distrib-
uiion of inuesrment  and employment  in
the single marker. This would greatly
amplifi  the positive  effects on growth
and' e-ploy-en r of the establiJhment
of the sinsle market.
L2.J. Th; disappearance  oF national
currencies will alio eliminate  the need
for expensive  rate-fixing  and exchange
cosrs. with resultant  be-nefits lor the-
production, trade and services sectors.
| .2.4. The hieher level of inesration of
rhe common iapital market dill make
the sinqle currency  a more significanr
countei*eisht to the US dollar and the
yen, and *iil ."ur. it to gro_w in impor-
tance as a feserve currency. lnvestors  ln
search of international  diversification
may be expected to increase the weight-
ing of the 
^"euro" in their portfolios.
Hi"eher capital imports will benefit the
.ur"r.rr.u  iiself and real interest  rates. A
stable clrrcncy and the associated
lower financing costs are important
pteconditions  for more investment,
growth and employment.
I .2.5. From a more general Point of
view, the combined dffecr of rhe intro-
duction oF the sinele currency and the
comoletion  of the"single  marilet will
enab'le the EU. by rhJbeginning of the
21" Century, to be one of the top three
or four economic and political pbwers
at world lwel. No Euiopean stlte, by-
itsell could achieve  such a position of
influence.
1.?-6. The single currency will make it




This does not mean that the price of a
homogeneous  eood will be rhe same on
all Euiopean -l"tk.tt. Bur relative price
chanees-will  be more easily discernible.
This"will  suarantee the efficient  use of
available ,irou...r. The EUt prosperity
will increase.
1.2.7 . lt is also expected that the cre-
arion oFa single currency area will
mal<e moneta"ry  poliry more effective'
Initial emoirical  studies'  indicate that
aggregate monerary de mand in Europe
is"iroie stable than demand For the
national components of the aggregate.
| .3. Thus, EMU will offer far-reach-
ing opportunities. Hasry and ill-pre-
pared implementarion,  on the other
'h, nd, cou ld be dangerous. Once the
third stase of EMU enters into force
th. .,rrrJ,l.y merger will be irreversible.
It is thereFore important in the run-up
to monetary union to discuss all rele-
vant problems  and to establish the best
nossible framework  lor the common
economic area and relations between
3  COM(95)  503 final,31.10.1995.
4  See M. Falk and N. Funke, The Stabiliry of
Money Demand in Germany and in the EMS:
Impact of Cerman Unification.  in
\V;lrwir$..hafuiLhes  Archiv 131 {J). pp.470-488this area and the citizen. In view of the
many quesdons which the single cur-
rency raises, this draft Opinion focuses
on a few key issues. The ihoice of sub-
jects for discussion reflects the social
interests represented at the ESC. More
detailed  consideration is a.lso qiven ro a
number oI subiects for which"closer
examination was shown to be desirable
in the liehr of the Opinion on the
Green Piper. The loliowing aspecrs  oF
monerary union are developed in
grearer  oetait:
.  interpretarion  and application ofthe
convergence criteria laid down in
the EC Tieary (Secrion 2);
.  establishment  of conversion  rates
(Section 3);
.  srarring date For monerary union
(Section 4):
.  position  of the future European
Central Bank (Section  5);
.  derogation Member  States: econom-
ic considerations  and monetary
cooperation (Section 6);
.  consequences  of monetary union for
the labour market (Section  7);
.  measures to be taken in the field of
communications  (Section B).
2.  The convergence criteria -
interpretation and application
2.I.  The establishment  of a common
monerary area is economically desirabie
if economies which have arta.ined  a sim-
ilar level of developmenr merqe. In Een-
e1{, tle suitabiliry  of a regiorifor pir-
trctPa on rn a common  currency
depends on its ability ro reacr flixibly
ano nomoqeneously  to exogenous
shocks.  \X/fien economies oTa similar
level of development are merged, coun-
tries will enjoy the advantagef of a sin-
gle currency - primarily  increased
invesrmenr,  growth and employment.
lf, however, economies wirh different
levels of developmenr  are mereed, the
disappearance  of flexibte  e*chinge ,"res
can be disadvanrageous.  The corinrries
which do nor satiii'y rhe reaj conver-
gence crireria run the risk, as will be
seen below, of nor beins able to keeo
pace wirh the others ani of losing '
(export) market shares to econonii.dly
srronger regions for a rime. The resulr
would be more under-employment  in
the economically weaker regions. The
resulting large disparities  in-regional
income structures would carrrthe risk
oF social and politica.l tensioni  in rhe
common  monerary area. Large financial
transfers would be needed to maintain
social peace. As a result ofexternal eco-
nomic inregration,  a secondary effect
would be tf,at loss of demand'in the
weaker economies would impact  nega-
tively on growrh in the centril region.
2,2,  These considerations  are reflect-
ed in the F.C teaty. The convergence
criteria laid down in fudcle t09i(1) (see
box) will be used ro determine which
Member States will be amonq the first
ro parricipate in monerary uiion. ln
view oFrhe observarions made in ooint
2.1., rhe ESC thinla thar a broad-brush
approach  to rhe scope lor inrerprerarion
ailowed bv rhe Trearv would not be
without problems.
2.3. The question thus arises  as to
how the .o.rverg..rce criteria are to be
interpreted in practice. Phrases  such as
"substanrially and conri nuously" and
"sufficienrly'd iminishinq", usei in rhe
EC Tieaty, 
'leave 
a grear"deal  oF scope
for interpreration. Th. ESC rher.i6.e
calls on ihe Council to clarify the con-24vergence  criteria before entry to mone-
tary union. This would have the advan-
tage of giving governmenrs  clear targets.
It would also prevent excessively lax,
polirical interpreration  of the enrry cri-
teria. This is a real dangeq.given  that
aqmrssron  to monetary unron requlres a
qualified majority in the European
Council (at present 62 out of87 votes).
Thus, countries  which will rhemselves
probably not qualifr for monetary
union, will be required ro approve  the
entry oF other Member Stares.
2.4. The ESC feels that rhe conver-
gence criteria need to be clarified in a
iumber of respects. Thus, it is not clear
from the text of the Tleaty whether the
price criterion applies ro rhe average, or
ihe worst value oF rhe rhree most irable
currencies. In order to orovide a more
precise definition  the ESC suggests that
the price criterion be regarded as ful-
filled if the average inflation rare does
not exceed by more than 1fi percenrage
points the GDP-weighted  average infla-
tion rate of the three best performing
Member States.
2.5. The ESC also sees a need for
clarification  of the price criterion
because of its relationship to the inrer-
est criterion. It is hoped thar, as a result
of the creation ofthe European single
currency  area, tne PartlclPattng
economies will benefit from perma-
nently lower average EU interest rates.
This expectation  is primarily justified
by the greater depth of the capital mar-
ket in the future European  currency
area. The mainrenance  of lower inreresr
rates is a precondition for higher invest-
ment in Europe and hence for boosting
employmenr. The resultanr  gains in
producrivity and inrernarionlal  com ped-
tiveness  are expected to fuel higher
investment and employment. .
2.6. The exchanee-rate criterion also
needs clarificatiorr.-O.t  2 Aueust 1993
the fluctuation margins were-widened
from +l-2.25o/o to i-15o/o. The new,
wider fluctuation marsins take account
of the massive increasJ in caoital mobil-
ity over recent years and the consequenl
high degree of volariliry on the curiency
markets. The adiustmenr of the fluctua-
tion margins  was also intended to
deprive tEe markets of an easy rarget for
spiculative  attack. This hr. pioueJ ru.-
cissful,  as shown by the deviation indi-
cator. This indicator shows whether the
behaviour of.a cu rrency paniciparing.in
fhe Intervenflon  system lS clevlaung stg-
nificanLly from rhar ofthe other pirtiii-
pating currencies'. Vith marker volatili-
ry virtually unchanged,  rhe indicator is
showing much  less -uiolenr flucruations.
And finallv, many EMS currencies were
able ro return to iheir old fluctuation
marqins within a short time of rhe
widdning of the margins.
2.6.1. At +l-l5o/o, the limits beyond
which adiustment of the bilateral cen-
ual rate ii reouired are so wide that
speculation  his become a much less sig-
nificant factor in exchange-rare  move-
ments. Fundamentals  no:w play a com-
paratively more imporranr  iole. This
has made it easier for fundamenrally
"healthy'' currencies to remain within
the narrow +l-2.25o/o fluctuation mar-
gin. A currencyt ability to remain wirh-
in a narrow margin around the central
rate can be regarded  as a criterion for
entry to monetary union. The ESC
therifore Feels rhit the followine
approach  could be adopted to rf,. -o.r-
5  SeeDeutscheBundssbank,  Devisenkursstatistik,
May 1995, sradstical  appendix  to monthly  report
5. o. 84
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25itoring of convergence. !/hilst formally
retainlng the enlirged +l-l5o/o flucrua-
uon matglns, the exchange-rate cflterl-
on should be reearded  as-fulfilled il
during the rwo !."rt prior to entry to
the th'ird stase of moietary union, no
adiustments"hat e been made to a cur-
rencyt bilateral centrd rate and if, dur-
ing the final year before rhe examina-
tiJn. the.uri.n.y  has remained within
a sufficiently  nario* fluctuation margin
relative to the bilateral central rate. It
will be for the Council of Ministers  to
define the expression "sufficiently  nar-
row" when assessing convergence.  The
F-.SC. however. rhink that ivalue
which takes account of (a) actual eco-
nomic conditions  and (b) the principle
of obsewing competitive neurality
should be fixed.
2.7 .  Clarification of the government
deficit and sovernment de6t ratio crite-
rion poses ,tr. gr.",.rt political prob-
l.m. ih" *ordlng of the EC Tiiary
leaves considerabT. tcop. For interpreta-
tion.
2.7.1.The provisions  of Article 104c in
respect of gbvernmenr  deficits state that
Mimber Siares  shall avoid excessive
govefnment deficits.
2.7 .2.,Paragraph  2 goes.on to define the
way this policy is to be implemenred, as
follows:
'  The Commission shall moniur  the
d.euelobment  of the budgetary sina tion
and of rhe stoih of gouinmint  debt in
the Member  States with a uiew to
id,erylfiinS gross enors. In pa.rticuta,r ir
shdu exalntne  rcmolldnce  wttn ou0-
geury discipline o.n the basis of the fol-
Lowtng two cnterta:
r{erence aalue,  unless
- either the ratio has dzclined sub'
stantially  and continuouslY  and
reached'a leuel that comei close to
the reference ualue;
- on abernatiueh,  the excess ouer
the reference ualie is only exceP'
tionil and temooran a;d the ratio
remains  close ti theVeference  ualue;
b) uhether  the ratio of gouemment
drbt to gros domeitic producr
exrceds"a reference  ualue, unless the
ratio is sufficientfi dininishing
and appiiaching  rhe referenci
ualue at d sdtrsldctory  pace.
The reference ualues are specified in
the Piotocol on the excessiue deficit
proredure annexed lo this Tieiry. "
2.7 .3. Protocol No. 5 to the Tieaty
defines and spells out (Article 1) the ref-
erence values  referred to in Tieaty Arti-
cle l04cQ).
'  io/o for the ratio ofthe planned or
acrual {orern*rrt difrir. io gross
domestir Product at mark?t Prrces:
-  600/o for the ratio of gouernment
debt to gross dome*ic jriduct at mdr-
het prica."
2.7.4. Prctocol No 5 defines (Article 2)
what is meanr by '7ouernment",  "dzficit",
"irrestment"  and 'iebr" and confirms
(Arricle 3) that governments  are respon-
sible for the defilcits ol "general gouern'
lnent  .
2.7 .5. Parasraphs  3 to | 4 of Article
l04c eive Jetails of the procedure  For
Comriission, Council and Parliament
monitoring of government deficits. A
timetable i6r tK. .o.pl.tion of Eco-
nomic and Monetary  Union  is given in
Article 109e of the EC Tleaty. !fith the
exception  of paragraphs 1, 9, l1 and
a) whether  the ratio ofthe pknned or
actual gouernment  defcit to gros
domestlc broduft exceeds a
2614, Article 104c is applicable  from the
start of the second  phase of completion
otEMU.
2.7.6. Consequently,  should any Mem-
ber State fail to comply with the criteria
regarding government'deficits  or debts
Foi pu rp"osis  oF rransition to the rhird
phase, the Commission  is to prepare a
reporr (ParasraDh  3). A commitree,
orovided For"in'fucicle  109c, deliuers an
bpinion on this Commission  report
(Paragraph 4). IF rhe Commission  con-
siders-thit  a Member State's deficit is
excessive,  it addresses  an opinion to the
Council which shall, under paragraph
6, 'hrring bJ a. qugltfed,mQoriry.on  a
recommendatrcn  ftom lhe Lommlsston,
and hauin[ considered  any obseruations
whirh the"Member State Toncerned  may
wish rc make, decide afer an ouerall
dssessment  whether  an excesiue fficit
exists."
2.7 .7 . A joint reading of these texts
shows that it is not absolutely  necessary
when determinine  whether Member
States meet the cdnditions  to join the
Monetarv  Union, for the ratio between
qor..rn-.n, deficit and GDP to be
inder 3olo. It is sufficient  for:
-  the ratio to have declined substan-
tiallv and continuouslv  and to have
.."ched 
" 
level that comes close to
the reference  value,
-  or for the excess over the reference
value to be only exceptional  and
temporary and lor the ratio to
,.-"i.r close ro the relerence value.
2.7.8. The "substantial  and continuous"
narure of the decrease, rhe proximiry ro
the "reference aalue" and the 'bxceptional
and timDorary  excess" are matters fot the
Councii to a-ppraise  (deciding by a
qualified  maiotiry oFits me-ib.ir'  uotes,
*eighred in accordance with Article
148(2), excluding the votes o[the rep-
resentative of the Member  Stare con-
cerned). The Council then decides
'hfier an ouerall  assessmenr"  (Paragraph
6i whether or not an excessive  dFfiiit
exists.
2.7,9. The reference  to an 'ouerall  asess'
ment" gives the Council a margin of
appraiiJ which is not defi ned in any
tiit. The Council should be able to
take account of the date on which the
Treary of Maastrichr was signed, viz. 7
F.bruarv 1992 - ar which Jme the eco-
nomic situation  in the signatory States
differed sisnificantly from the situation
which wilf orevail on the date when the
Council takes its decision. As a result,
the values specified in Protocol No. 1,
namely  a government deficir of Jolo and
" 
nou.rn-".n, debt of 600/o of GDII are
.rJt hard and fast limits and the Coun-
cil has a substantial,  sovereign margin
of appraisal, deciding by a qualified
ma.,oflry.
2.7 .10. At the time the Tleaty was
drafted, the signatory states clearly real-
ized that the European  economy, like
the world economv  or individual
national economies, was in the throes
of constant change, determined by fac-
tors beyond the Member  States' con-trol. The Member  States therefore
decided (over six years prior to imple-
mentation of these Tfeaty provisions)
against  fixed and inflexible convergence
criteria as regards reference values. Oth-
erwise the provisions  envisaged  could
well have proved inapplicable.
2.7.11. In the light of the foregoing. ir
now seems  necessary for all parties
again to focus on the goal of these pro-
visions, namely the introduction  of a
single currency for the EU Member
States. The feasibiliry oF this venture is
conditioned  far more by the 'real con-
uergence" of the various economies than
by rhe "binding" force of criteria.
2.7 .12. ln the same context, the ESC
would point out that an approach  based
on Council Decisions  certainlv does
not mean that the ptecise ovJral
assessment  criteria, can be ignored in
the context of ffirts to n'eaie a "stong"
culrenc!. On the contrary, it would
stress that the goal of convergence must
be regarded  asin indispensa6le  objec-
tive.
2.7.73. The deficit ratio should also be
interpreted in like manner. In the ESCI
view, this ratio could be said, to be close
to the reference ualue if it exceeds  this
value by no more than I perccnrage
point. fhe deficit ratio .o,rld b" rlid to
have declined substantially and continu-
ously if ft has fallen for three years in
succession. And a deficit could be said
to be exceptional and temporary  if it
exceeds tie reference  value oniy for the
durarion oFa ryclical downswing. The
government debt criterion should be
quantified  in such a way thar the results
of earlier convergence  monitoring  do
not have to be r&ised rerrospecri;ely.  A
case in point is Ireland, which in 1995
was found by the Commission and the
Council of Ministers  to have made suf-
ficient progress  on reducing its govern-
ment-debt  ratio.
2.8.  Member  States wishing to take
part in EMU must pursue a stricr con-
vergence poliry. The Council will at all
events make a political interpretation of
the convergence criteria when deciding
on whether Member  States are to be
admitted to the third stage of EMU.
Too small a group of Member  States
would nor justifr the high costs associ-
ated with introduction  of a sinqle cur-
fency.
2.9. In this connection,  the question
arises as to whether exclusive concentra-
tion on monetary, budgetary and debt
criteria makes for an ootimum  selection
process. The ESC feelJ that, in order to
broaden  the circle of participants to an
economically more viable number, a
further examination  should be carried
out on (he basis of appropriate criteria.
This should be done, ho*ever, only
after a rigorous examinarion on thi
basis of the criteria laid down in Articie
109j(1), and then only with respect to
countries  which fail to meer one only of
the five criteria. This approach could be
justified on rhe grou nd-s-that  rhe admis-
sion criteria are biased towards  mone-
tary and fiscal policy measures.  But
most of the selection criteria mooted in
economic oublications relate to real
economic  variables. And even the EC
Tleaty calls for the application  ofother
criteria. alrhouqh the wordinq is vague.
Article I09(l)(I)  also refers tJ'the "
results o[the integration  of markers",
"the situation and develooment of the
balances of payments  on current
account , "the development ofunit
labour cosls" and "other orice indices"
as factors to be taken into accounr.
2.10. The advantages  ofa further
examination are neatly illustrated  by thecase of Belgium. On the basis of the
definition  set out in the Tieam Bel-
gium's ratio of government debt to
GDP currently  stands at 133.5o/o. Even
the most strenuous efforts would be
insufficient to brine this ratio close to
the Tireary's 6070 bJnchmark bv 1g97,
the year of rhe convergence examina-
tion. Even under the EC Treary's more
flexible requiremenrs  rJnr, in order to
qualify, a Member Statet deficit ratio
should be "sufficiently  diminishing and
approaching rhe reference  ualue ati sar-
isfactory pace" (Arricle 104(cX2)),  Bel-
gium could clearly hardly qualifr for
partrcipation  in monetary union from
the point ofview ofthe debt criteria.
2.i0.1. And yet Belgium is a country
which enjoys a high iegree oFeconomic
stabiliry  as illustrated  bv the fact rhar it
fulfils ihe price, interest'-rate  and
exchange-rate  criteria set out in rhe
Tieaty. Belgium would also qualifr for
monetary union on the basis of a num-
ber of real economic  measures.  These
include continuing  iarge balance of pay-
ments surpluses despire a real revaluarion
ofrhe Belgian franc, rhe degree ofopen-
ness of thd Belgian econom! a"d rhe fact
that Belgium  is a relatively small econo-
my. And finally. Belgium's  structure of
production  - a highly developed services'
sectot a strong industrial sector and a
small agricultural sector - are comparable
with those of many other European
countries. This means rhat terms of trade
shocks would have a symmetrical  effect
and that the exchangelrate adjustment
instrument would not be needed.
2.1 l. An examination focusins exclu-
sively on the convergence crireiia will
thus nor necessarily  lead to rhe selection
of the countries most suitable for par-
ticipation in monetary union.
3.  Establishment of the conver-
sion rates to be applied on entry ro
the third stag. oF-on.tary uniln
3.1. The ESCI discussions on the
introduction of rhe single.currency  have
arways Deen cotoured by the concern
that the conversion  rates to be set for
entry ro monetary union could be dis-
torted by specularion  on rhe rnrerna-
tional financial ard currency markers.
The danger ofspeculative  aitacks will
be partic-ularly  acure during rhe period
whin the members of the new currency
union have a.lready been decided by the
Council but rhe currencies of the oar-
ticipating countries have not yet been
irrevocably linked. The EC Tleaty con-
tains no clear provisions  on rhe conver-
sion rates at which entry to the single
currency will occur. Article l090XZ)
does stipulate that the transition to the
third stige shall not modi6' the exrernal
value ofihe ecu. Strictly interpreted,
however, this would m.a.r th"i currency
union would have to take place at the 
'
market rares valid on the d-ay before
conversion.  The ESC can noi endorse
this approach.
3.2. In order to prevent cost-induced
disrortions of com-petition in interna-
tional trade, the ESC considers it essen,
tial to ensure  that speculative upheavals
do not lead to fundamentally  uniusti-
fied.conversion rates being appliid ar
the beginning of monerari union. This
is all r[e mori import".rr in rhe light of
tne expenence garnered from the
exchange-rate mechanism  oF the EMS,
that exchange  rates justified in real eco-
nomic terms are an essential orecondi-
tion for the success ofa currency  svs-
tem. If a counrry  parricipares  in a cur-
renry sysrem at an exchange  rate which
is too high it runs the risklF losing
price competitiveness.  This would be all
-the more problematic on entry to the
third sragi of monetary union as, with
the disapipearance of national curren-
cies, such overvaluarion could no
loneer be compensared for by a relative-
lv liw level ofinr.tesr  rates. The dis-
t'orting effects on external trade flows
wouldb. permanent and could only be
corrected by producriviry.  gains in.the
countries with overvalued currencles.
But as such gains are in the short term
nearly alwayi achieved  via job losses,
the citchinq-up  process would be par-
ticularly p""inf,lt i"a would lead ro a
funher'rise in unemployment  in the
countries  concerned. This would also
have a detrimental  effect on public
acceptance of the common currency.
3.3. One way of eliminating this
problem would be to declare auerage
iates established  over at least Nvo years
to be the conversion  rates. The
exchange  rate must not diverge signifi-
cantly irom rhe average  value over this
perioi, howeuer. Theldvantage of this
ipproach over the central rates proce-
du're is that the market plays the deci-
sive part in determining  fundamentally
"correct exchange  rates.
3.4. Another fpro..h would be to
use a weishrinq  syitem which would
assign a iteadil"y decreasing weighting to
market rates as the lffevocaDle nxrng or
exchange  rates approached.-In  otder to
deprivJmarker  operators of targets for
spiculation it would be a good idea not
to oublish the weiehting svstem  used.
In 'thi. *ay .rrr..riy spicil"tions  rak-
inq place shorrly befoie monetary
un"ion in oarricular would not affect the
conversron rates.
3.5. The models presented here are
only some of the possibie solutions.
Th; ESC does noi consider  ir particu-
larly important which of them is cho-
sen. 'What is important  is that the
responsible  European  institurions
should be aware of rhe Problem and
should plan in advance their response
in the event of major disturbances  on
the currency markets. No satisfactory
proposals haue so far been officially
-ade in this regard. ln its study of the
transition ro thi single currenry  pub-
lished in November-l995, the Euro-
pean Monetary  Institute makes no
mention of thi problem. The view
exoressed bv the Commission  in its
abbve-me.tiiotted Green Paper, that
stricr application  oF the convergence
criteria will be sufilcienr to prevent  dis-
rurbances on the financial and currency
markets, is essentially correct. But even
then, speculation  cannot be entirely
excludid.  The experience of the EMS
has shown this. Again and again funda-
mentally "healthy''  currencies were
dragged do*.t in the wake of other cur-
r"nEies. It is also conceivable  rhat cur-
renry turmoil might originate outside
the EU. Many European  currencles
come under pressur6 whenever  the US
dollar is weak. The most recent exam-
ole of this occurred  at the turn of
| 9941 1995, when European  currencies
came under devaluation pressure as a
result of the peso crisis. The ESC Feels
that the Community  must be prepared
for exogenous  shocks of this kind
which i-rieht coincide with entry to the
third stage of monetary union.
4.  Starting date for monetary
union
4.1. The starting date for the third
phase of monetary union is now virtu-
allv certain to be I Januarv 1999' as
pr6vided for bv tuiicle 109i (4) of the
EC Tr."tv. The Councit must decide
"which Member  States fulfil the neces-
,tt{..
,.' 3$. -.sarv conditions  for the adootion  ofa
single cunency'' by the deadline  of 30
June 1998. According to the letter oF
the Tfeary, the single currency  should
be introduced  even if,, in the extreme
case, only one country satisfies the stat-
ed conditions. The spirit ofthe provi-
sions is obviously quite different.
4.2. Clearly - as has been repeatedly
stated - the Tieaty is intended to estab-
lish a 'ttable currency", which repre-
sen$ the aggregate of a number of
equally  stable currencies. The long-term
stability of the single currency depends
on the prospects for sustainable devel-
opment in those economies,  a factor
too frequently accorded secondary
importance, if not ignored.
4.3. As indicated in Section 2, the
admission  criteria provided for by the
Tieaty are, in many respects, so elastic
as to allow scope for that degree of
pragmatism which, bearing in mind all
relevant factors, might prove necessary
when they are applied. Such pragma-
tism must not, however,  be interpreted
either as laxity or a departure  from the
established criteria. The goal of creating
a strong, stable currenry musr be given
prioriry in alI decision-maLing.
4.4. GDP srowth, which has
remained  bel-ow forecasts in some coun-
tries, the problem of managing public
finances and employment  trends, which
are critical almost everywhere. are all
now giving rise to concern  for the
future. This has heloed to create doubt
in political and economic circles, which
is perhaps even greater among the gen-
eral public, as to whether a significant
group of countries can qualify for
admission  to monemry union by
30 June 1998.
4.5. The Tfeaty defines the date and
procedure to be adopted For the srart of
monetary union. This Fact should auto-
matically dispel any doubts and prompt
the Member  States to take all necessary
steps to meet the specified conditions  in
the short time remaining before the
decision  date.
4.6.  Efforts aimed solely at ensuring
enrry to monetarv union will not be
sufficient. The pieconditions  for the
sustainable, long-term growth referred
to in Point 4.2. must also be created. It
is becoming imperarive ro adopr grad-
ual growrh policies,  whilst avoiding
temporary emergency measures and, in
particula! social disruption.  This
approach  may be time-consuming  and
the deadline  may be missed. It would,
however, be in the interests ofany
Dotential adherent,  as well as of mone-
tary union as a whole, to opt for
de[aved  admission  from a ffrm founda-
tion rather than for hasry admission
with no prospect of stability.
4.7 .  Nevertheless, the basic question
remains:  is there sti sufficient  rime ro
enable a significant.  number of coun- 
.
tfles to Parflclpate rn monetafy unroni
Moreover,  what would constitute a "sig-
nificant number"? The ESC believes
that the actual total is not, in itself, rel-
evant; it is more important for the sin-
gle currency to be created by countries
iuhi.h ton.th., account for at least 50olo
of EU GDP
4.7 .1. In this connection,  the following
table shows individual national GDP
rates and assumes  a monetary union
which initially includes  Germany, Aus-
tria, the Benelux countries, France, Ire-
land and Finland. It is further assumed
that the UK and Denmark will use the
opt-out clause and that Italy. Spain,
Sweden, Porrugal and Greece are not in
a oosition to aicede. It is obvious thatneither the 50% threshold nor mone-
tary union could be achieved  without
Germany and France - a lact which
now seems to be politically accepted.
5.  The position of the future
European Central Bank and the
interrelationship between national
fiscal and European  monetary poli-
cy
5.1. The EC Tieaty defines the legal
status of the ECB and its main respon-
sibiliry in Articles 105 (objectives and
tasks of the ESCB) and 107 (ECBt
independence of instructions). The first
r.nt.n.. of Article 105(l) in particular
states that "The primary objective of
the ESCB shall be to maintain price
stability'. For the Member States, the
experience  of recent decades  justified
giving priority to the securing of mone-
tary stabiliw. Thus, countries with a low
infiation raie would have relatively low
real interest  rates and hence a more
robust record of investment and iob'
creation. Economic rheory also predicrs
this, as the efficient allocation of
resources via relative price changes  is
possible only if there is monetary stabil-
ity. In times of high inflation the price
structure is distorted and Driccs can no
longer perform their guiding function,
with its positive impact on prosperity. It
is not only the goods market which is
affected by loss of information as a
result of inflation. The oositive correla-
tion of price and intereit-rate  levels, and
ofprice and wage levels, also has a neg-
ative impact on factor markets. The
result is a misallocation of fesources on
virtually all markets, and ultimately for-
gone growth:  on the goods market,
because  producers cannot gear supply to
demand;  on the capital market, because
savings are no longer lent to investors
whosi proiects  prJmise the highest
returns; on the labour market, because
wage earners can no longer identifr the
actlviw with the stronseic demand Fot
laboui.
5.1.1. The primacy of securing mone-
tary stability does not, however, mean
that the ECB is absolved of resoonsibili-
ry for economic policy. The second sen-
tence of Article 105(l) clearly points to
the ECB's responsibility, as "without
prejudice ro the obiective of price sra-
biliry the ESCB shall support the gen-
eral economic policies in the Commu-
niry with a view to contributing  to the
achievement  o[ the obiectives of the
Community  as laid down in Article 2",
for example a high level of employ-
ment.
5.1 .2. ln view of rhe reouirements  aris-
ing from this legal framework - primacy
of monetary stabiliry support of eco-
nomic policy objectives wirhout preju-
dice to orice stabiliw - the ESC calls for
imoroviments to facilitate the ECBI
performance of its primary task. The
planned shape oF monetary union is not
likely, the ESC feels, to guarantee non-
inflationary provision  of money,  despite
the existence  of an issuing bank with
the best oossible institutional  safe-
guards. 
^
5.1.3. Probably the greatest  threat to
the maintenance  of monetary stabiiiw is
posed by fiscal policy. One of the
remaining  unsolved  conceptual prob-
lems in the wav of monetarv union  is
the different siiuation with resard to
powers in respect of fiscal and-o.teta.y
oolicv. 'il/hilst the ESCB is the instru-
ineni for the implementation of a
supranational monetary poliry has been
created in the shape of the ESCB, fiscal
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exc[ange  rates,national sovernments' which in the
Iieht oFtf,e subsidiariry principle is to
bI welcomed'  The room for manoeuvre
in resDect  of the allocation of fiscal
poweis should be used in a decentral-
ired *"y in order to bring decision-
making closer to the citizen,
5.1.4. This separation carries with it,
howevet the danger of monetary poliry
endeavours  aimed at stability  being viti-
ated by destabilizing  fiscal policies in
the Member States.ln this context the
sanction mechanisms provided for in
Article I04c of the EC Treary (monitor-
ine of the budgetary  situation in the
MZmber Statei) have been repeatedly
criricized as too weak. First and fore-
most, sanctions can be imposed only by
a ruo-thirds majoriry in thLe Council' If
a (qualified)  maioriry ofllember  Stares
is experiencing  structural  budge.t .prob-
lems therefore,  [ar-reach ing decisions
are unlikely. It would therefore  be advis-
able to maiG the sanctions'  mechanisms
automatic, thus avoiding the need for
long drawn-out  votes in-the Council of
Miiisters. Moreover,  the timescale for
the implementation  of sanctions is too
lons. li- the procedures laid down in
futicle I04c are strictly adhered. to ten
years could easily pass beFore effective
measures are taKen'
5.1.5. The ESC welcomes a number of
proposals aimed at increasing fiscal dis-
iiofine in the Member States. [t sees a
need for an additiond  agreement limit-
ins new annual indebtedness to an eco-
ndmically  acceptable  level and provid-
ing for appropiiate sanctions in the
evint of inFringement  of the stability
criteria. The ESC tooks with favour on
the proposal rhat interest-free deposits
with th'e ECB be required' in the event
of an excessive  budget deficit, ro be
refunded only when the budget situa-
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tion had been rectified. So as not to
imoose an additional burden on coun-
tries facing fiscal problems, the amounts
deoosited 
"shou.ld not be taken into
,.io,rnr in calculating the budget
deficit. The ESC feels, however, that
such a stabiliry pact should also provide
scope for stabiliiation  of demand in
times oF recession.  BuL this should be
expressly,  limited to the duration o[ the
cycllcal downswlng.
5.1.6. A voluntary additionai agreement
berween rhe participating countries
committing ih.-  to sou-nd budgetary
oolicies would have maior advantages.
First, it would increase citizens'  confi-
dence in the monetary union as, with
much stronger stabiliry requirements'
the commoi currencY would run less
risk of weakness. And secondly, volun-
tary fiscal policy restraint would allay
citirens'  fears of the state sector taking
an ever sreater slice of their incomes. A
stabiliry"pact would also strengrhen  the
oolitical union as, in addition to mone-
iary policy, a degree of national  respon-
sibiti'n' foi fiscal policy would indirectly
be transferred totommuniry level
without any increase in the European
central budget.
5.l.7.The ESC calls on the responsible
Eurooean  institutions to take measures
to fuither convergence in economic
policy. The reduciion  of debt-financed
itate demand will have disinflationary
effects. Another  welcome efFect of a sta-
biliry pacr would be to reduce govern-
ment recourse to the capltal marKet.
This would result in falling real interest
rates and, hence, a better climate for
privare investment, private consump-
iion and, ulrimately, employmenr.
5.2. Nevertheless, the ECB's task of
maintainins price stabilirv  is not inde-
pendent o["th. othet factors contribur-lng to economic convergence, which is
rhe responsibiliry of rhe-Member Stares.
It is for rhem [o control public expendi-
ture, nor only with rega rd to inveir-
menr but a.lso in_respict  of social provi-
sions, public health lnd pensions.'
R^ed.ucing unemploymeni  should be one
of their main objectives  alongside the
goal of mai ntaining  cornpeti n-veness.
lnflarion should bJconriined and.
when necessary, reduced. A fiscal policy
in tune with sustainable growth repre- 
-
sents the cornerstone  o[ t-he entire sys-
tem.
5.2.1. The foregoing sives rise ro the
following obseriatio-ni an independen r
ECB .policy on currency managemenr
and rhe mainrenance  oF price s-rabiliw
would have ro be backed up by nariJnal
economic and social policies. These
policies  are, ho-wever,lhe  responsibility
of authorities facing differeni nationj
situarions  which cai involve a mix of
measures that are not necessarily  com-
patible with the goal of convergence.
5.3. Thus, compliance  with the con-
vergence  criteria - which are sound  eco-
nomic policy principles, quite aparr
f rom being requiremenrs  of the Tieaw -
becomes  oT vita.l importance for the '
individual Member States and the
Communiry  as a whole. l[ rhis principle
is accepted, purely "national" policies'
are clearly.no longer accrptablie. Eco-
nomrc policies  musl be based on com-
mon guidelines  aimed  ar creating the
condirions  lor admission to the Jingle
currency,
5.4. Under the Tieary the European
Central Bank is required to p.lr.u'e the
objective of mo.retary stability. It is not
clear, however, what will be riearded  as
the highesr acceprable  inflarioi rare for
the EU. And thus fiscal, wages and
monerary poliry lack a conciete bench-
mark, making it diFficult for economic
operarors to know what ro expecr,
5.4.1 . h wou.ld seem appropriate to for-
mulate a medium-rerm  inflarion tareet
binding for a period o[ sweral y."rrlAn
argument against such an annual target
is tJrat exogenous shocks - such as a rlse
in the price of crude oil - could tem-
porarily lead to a higher rate of infla-
tion. If rhe future ECB were commirred
to an annual rarger, rhe result might be
excesslve  swrngs in monetary policy
leading to seve-re dislocation.  bn th.
factor and goods' markets.
5.4.2. Over the last few years a number
oFcountries have ser speiific inflation
targets. The experience gained by these
countries has been posirive.  Significanr
progress  has generaily been m""de on
reducing inflarion. The ESC feels that
2o/o would be a suitable medium-term
rarger ar European  level. This would be
in line wirh rhe policv pursued bv a
number of centri banks and thu's
would signal stabiliry to the markets.
5.5. _The EC Tieary neither spells out
an infiation  rarger nor specifies'rhe
monetary srraregy  ro be pursued  in
order ro underpin the value of monev.
One oF the EMI's main tasks durine ihe
second  stage oF EMU is to draw up"a
monerary  poliry plan. This is ro bi
ready by the end oF 1996. The ESC
therefore wishes to express irs views on
the subject now.
5.5.l..There are nvo possible srrategies
ror sateguardrng the value of money:
either d-irect usi oF monetary policy to
control inflation or adoptionbf a inter-
mediate target such as control of the
money supply.  Experience has been
acquired in respec ofboth these meth-
odi. The Bank'oF Eneland, lor examole.
uses control oF inflari'on and rhe Bun-desbank uses control of the money sup-
ply. Each of these approaches  has specif-
ic'adrrantages  and disadvantages.
5.1.2. Controlling  inllation  directly 
,
involves underpinning  the value ot the
currency  by inf]uencing  market inrerest
rates. The main problem with this
approach is the lack of certainry.as  to"
the optimum amount and duratlon ol
an interest-rate  change' Thus, there is a
danser that "the wro-ng  interest  rates"
and"variable time lags will actually
accentuate the cu rre-nt cycle. There is
also a structural hiatus in the causal
relationship beween  interesr rates and
the inflation  rate. 'Whilst, in the short
tefm, these two variables are inversely
correlated, in the longer term there is a
positive  correlation.
5.5.3. The biggest problem in using an
intermediate 
-rioneiary target is rhat a
clear positive relationship berween the
money supply and inflarion exists only
as long as monetary demand remains
.table]Recent  studies in the United
States  have shown that, as a result of
large-scale fi nancial market innovations,
thii condition is no lonqer fulfilled'
Numerous studies of the German mar-
ket, on the other hand, have shown that
even after unification monetary demand
remains stable.
5.5.4. For the purposes of European-.
level decisions, it is important to estab-
lish wherher  aggregate monetary
demand is sufficient to determine sra-
biliw. Numerous studies have been car-
ried'out on this question. The results so
far suggest that monetary demand is
more stable in a common  monetarY
area than in national monetary areasn.
Thus, an intermediate monetary target
could also be fixed in the new monetary
union. The main advantage  of this
aoproach is that an intermediate target
gives rhe financial  markets a central
E,ridance  value for expectarions.  IF a
ihol. ,.ti", of often contradictory indi-
cators (growth' business  expectations,
money supply trends, I nterest-rate
.tr,rctural'ti.nds, erc.) o[ future infla-
tionarv danqers are taken into account
in decidine jnterest policy ("looking at
everything""),  the baiic. criteria under-
oinnine tion.trry poliry are no longer
o.rfect"lv  obvious'to rhe market. The
i.rult.ttt u ncertainty produces compar-
atively greater volatiliry in the financial
marketJ with an uncertain investment
climate. Lastlv, the use of an intermedi-
ate monetary target has the advantage
of dispelline the impression  that mone-
tarv policy Is aimed-exclusively  at price
r,"Liii.v. Reletence should be made in
this context to the requirement'  con-
tained in the second sentence  ofArticle
105(1), thar the ECB suPPort the gen-
eral economic policies in the Commu-
nrty.
5.5.5. The ESC is, of course, aware that
the use of an intermediate monetary
tarset can also cause problems' In the
.orir.*t oF ongoing financial  market
innovation an"d evir-increasing  capital
market movements,  failure to meet rhe
money supply target cannot be ruled
our. This could pose serious problems
for rhe European Cenrral Bank. If in
rhe interestsbf  its reputation,  it was
undulv strict in the Pursuit of the
-oney supply obieciive, it could jeopar-
dire sro*ili. On the other hand, the
mark"et could interpret a failure to act as
f,  See M. Falk and N Funke  loc. "it. 
and O rnd
LLM. Kremers and PD. Lane. tconomic and
-Monetary 
Integrarion and rhe Demand for Money
in rhe EMS, ini tMF Staff Papers 37.pp.7t7'805a threat to stabiliry. To avoid such prob-
lems, it is crucial for overall EU mone-
tary demand to be more stable than
that of individual Communiry  regions -
possibly through a comparatively low
level of currencv  substitution. Use oF an
intermediate -Ln.t"ry  target seems
advisable if this condition is satisfied.
The ESC therefore  calls on the EMI to
intensifr its studies of the stabiliry of
monetary demand in the future curren-
cy area. The results of these studies
could orovide a basis for the EMI mon-
etary policy plan.
5.6. Maintaining the principle of
neutraliry with respect to competition
musr be the orime consideration when
eflect ing .urienry conversion.  Th is
app.lles.  to the desrgn ol Lhe monetary-
oolicv instruments  as well as to the for-
'-,rhlio.t of objectives and srrategy. ln
order to supply the banking  system
with central bank funds, all commercial
bank, regardless of size, must be given
direct access to ECB funds. Restricting
the furure ECB to open market transac-
tions will place smaller financial institu-
dons at a disadt antase. One of the
problems  is rhat smJler institutions
which do not trade actively on the
money markets have difficulry  dispos-
ing of the surplus funds arising from an
o#.-n.n.rou,,ender allocatioi.  This
problim.  does nor arise in the case of
relinancins  via sranding facilities.
Under this"svstem, theinancial  institu-
tion decides whether and when it wish-
es to cover its needs with central bank
funds. If close conttol of the money
supply is sought, central bank financing
.  tr,.  ,,  v,,
is inwitably subject  to quotas; in the
interests of a competition-neutral refi-
nancing poliry, it should therefore  be
ensured that the refinancing rate is not
significantly  below the maifet interest
6.  Derogation Member States:
economic considerations and,,mon-
etary cooPeration
6.1. Adoption oFthe single currency
will lead to'the creation o[-t*o gtoupi of
countries within the EU, namely those in
a position to ioin EMU and the remain-
ine countries. There is sdll some uncer-
tai-nty as to the identity of the "deroga-
tiori' countries, and it is not known
whether  the two Member States (Den-
mark and UK) which have secured the
'bpt-out" clause intend to apply it. k is,
howevet interesdng to examine the posi-
tion of the two diftrent groups  of coun-
tries and the relations between  them.
6.2. The advantages  of the single cur-
rency for participating countries  have
been amply described in reports and
Opinions of the Commission,  Council,
Parliament and the Economic and
Social Committee  itself, as well as in
countless statements, speeches  and wrir-
ings. \Wirh rhe exceprion of the oppo-





.  greater average price stabiliry
throushout the EU;
.  *.n.rJ, reduction in the cost of
iransactions and rate fixing;
.  greater.price  transparency  between
countfles;
.  lower administrative  and cash man-
agement costs for firms (excluding
staft-up  costs.,;
.  stimulus to growth,  competitiveness
and employment;
.  possibility  for the euro to become a
reserve currency.
6.2.1. The derosation countries  will
not enjoy these benefits of the single
-#'currency, finding themselves  in a less
favourable  oosition with a real risk of
the creation  of a "two-speed" Europe.
Non-participation in EMU must there-
fore represent  a 'transitional stage"  as
defined by the CommissionT. The
shorter this phase is, the less serious
will be its imoact. The ESC cannot fail
to endorse this position. The need for
derogation states to participate in EMU
without  delav will provide a stimulus
for rheir economic're-organization. At
the same time, the ESC would warn
against facile optimism and over-sim-
plificadon; the situation in several
countries shows no signs of dramatic
improvement  in the short term and
economic re-organization is an objec-
tive necessity, regardless ofthe need for
EMU membership.
6.3. The single market has progressed
and the EU inititutions have ion"e
what they could to promote growth. Ar
the same time, unemployment  and the
neeo to lmProve  competltrveness con-
tinue to be outstanding problems. Nei-
ther the .urr.rt 
".ono",nic 
situation in
Europe nor firture forecasts offer
encouragement  for Structural Fund
increases and the eeneral continuation
ofassistance  policies. All these factors
suggest that t]re much-vaunted "solidar-
ity" cannot be embodied in a policy of
further  subsid.ies; individual countiies
enlargement  would help to create a sig-
nificint nucleus of nonlparticipants. It
would no longer be a question of a
rwo-speed Europe but o[ rwo separate
groups, with a different understanding
of the term "Europe". The political
daneer would rhen overshadow  rhe
alrei'dy  serious economic risks.
6.1. In addition to the disadvantages,
cenain advantages  for the derogarion
countries must be taken into accounr.
They would be able to benefit from the
experience of the core group. Even
given the most thorough  preparation,
ihe introduction  of the" new currency
and the adoption  of a single monetary
policy by the ECB will not be free of
teething problems. It may even prove
advantageous to have more time to ful-
fil the convergence criteria. Abruptly
coming into line with the Maastricht
obiectives without concern  for a coun-
tryt structural  peculiarities could result
in loss of demand  with damaging con-
sequences for the labour markett; if
structural budeet deficits were eradually
reduced. how&er, such effects iould be
far less likely. Gradual reduction  of
structural deficits and a corresponding
reduction in the governmenr debr rario
should be reflectJd in a reduction  in
musr rmpose a more riqorous discipline
and exhibit  erearer self-reliance than in
the past.
6.4. Enlargemenr  of the European  8
Union to cover countries  which have
applied, or will apply, for membership -
though sweral will presumably  not be
ready for EMU entry immediately -
will constitute a new serious oroblem.
Together with the new derogition
states, derogation countries  which have
still not joined EMU at the time of
3€
"Exchanse  links berween the Member States tak-
ing panin  rhe thind phase of EMU and rhe orher
Mimbet  Stares":  Inrerim reporr  to rhe European
Council,  28 November 1995.
Thus a study carried out by the National Insrirure
for Economic  and Social  liesearch showed thar
reducing  all the EU Member  States' budg€t deficia
to rhe 39o level required  by the Maa.ctricFt  Tiearv  bv
1999 would lead ti the temoorarv  loss ofsom.  {rrli
a million iobs. Fulfillment  olthe febt criterion bv
2002 coJd lead .o the temoorarv  loss of a furthJr
million jobs. Greece wouldbe the hardest  hit, with
450,000 losr jobs. See R Barell.  J. Morgan and N.
Pain: The Emolornnent  Effects of the Ma,astricht
Fiscal  Criteria, Nitional  Insdrute for Economic  and
Social  Research  Discussion  Paoer 81.the risk premium component of interest interest to satisry the exchange-rate  cri-
rates. Yields would also benefit from  terion in the manner out'lined in Point
relatively lower expectations  of infla-  2.6.1. The advantage  of a flexible
tion. The resulting impetus to growth  approach of this kiid, the ESC feels, is
oueht, in the med'ium'term,  co"nsider- thit narro*ing of the fluctuation mar-
abii to ourweieh the loss of demand  qins would tesi in the market the suit-
r.rul,ing from"consolidation.  Final.ly, ibiliry of a currency for entry to the
the derogation countries  would have  monetary union.
access to the instrument of exchan^ge- 6.8. This approach would not be
rate adaptation, which could prove  ;;l"r;;;;.rs  for the common cur-
advantageous rn the lrght ot drtterent  rency. fu exp"lained in poim 4.4., a
productivity trends'  ,,ror,g "o--or, 
lrrrr.n.y could make
6.6. In view of the specid situation of  intervention on the foreign exchanges
the derogation .o.,nt.i., it will be nec-  necessary to support weak currencies.
.rr"ry to-nt"k arrangements for mone- The resulting monetary expansion  in
tary ielations betweei both groups of  the monetary union would Pose an
Member  States. Any possibll agreement  inflationary threat. Therefore T)r agree-
should be based on'diree key r;quire-  menr berween the monetary union and
ments: ensuring  that the irrtltni -.t-  the derogation countties must include
ket continues t6 oo.r"t. smoothly;  the instrument of devaluation of the
guaranteeing  the g'reatest possible level  central exchange-rate'
if .urr.n.y it"biliryl and i'acil itati ng the
transition  of the non-participating
countries to the singlJ currency iri the  7-.- .  Organization of the social
medium term.  didogue and consequences  for the
^--^L^-^^ labour market in a European mone- o./.  lne EJL aovocates  an excnange-
rate system  based on the EMS linkin!  t  y arex
the currencies ofthe derogation coun-  7.1. Underlying the planned Euro-
tries to the common currenry. \Vith  pean Monetary Union^is the convicrion
this aim in view the derogation coun-  that it would itrengthen the European
tries will, however, have to pursue a rig-  internal market. This is of particular
orous enti-inflationary poliry and a dis- importance in view of the EUt relative-
ciplined  fiscal policy. Only on this basis lv weak erowrh and employment  trends
should the future EtB iniervene in the  6f *,. t# few years. fuiing structural
market in conjunction with the central  unemployment  is one of Europet most
banks of the de.og"tion countries to  p.essiirg iocial problems. Since t98O
provide necessary exchange-rate sup-  employment  trends in the EU have
pon. Vith increasing suciess in atiain-  been disrincdy  less favourable  than in
irrs .o.ru"rs.rr.e,  thJcurrencies  of the  comparable  industrialized  countries.
deiogation-countries should be allowed The 
^average rise in employment in
to operate in progressively narrower  Europe between  1980 and 7994, was
fluctuation margins around the centrd some 1.25 percentage  poins lower than
Community .",i. To qualify for subse- the corresp6ndi.tg f;gui. for the US
quenr enrry [o monerary union, rhe  and approximar.ly OIA t lower than the
derogation countries would have wery  figure for Japan and the gaP condnuesto widen. Moreover, the figure for
Japan is considerably  depressed by the
structural crisis which has persisted
since 1990. The EU 1994 unemploy-
menr rare of 11.5o/o was 5.4 perceniage
points higher than that of the USA and
8.4 percentage  points higher than that
ofJapan. And the prospects for the
labour market are not likely to improve
rapidly. According to an OECD labour
market study', EU employment growth
in both oroduction-related  services and
high-technology products (compurers,
space  tech nology, genetic engineering
etc.) was below that of the USA and
Japan. In view of these trends, the
attention  of all oolitical and social lead-
ers must be focused on the realization
of the anricipated employment  gains
rrom monetary unlon.
7.2. The EC White Paper and the
OECD labour-market study referred to
above pinpointed the rising pressure of
taxes and levies on wages and dcclining
lnvestment and lnnovaflon  as the maln
causes of rising unemployment.
Although the widely postulated nega-
tive correlation berween  wage costs and
employment trends is not eirpirically
proven, it is undeniable at a time of
growing mobiliry of capital that labour
costs - particularly when amplified  by
fundamentally  unjustified  exchange-rate
movements - are becoming  a steadily
more tmDortant determrnant tn lntef-
national comoetition. On the other
hand, in the medium  to long term ade-
quate employment growth  can clearly
be guaranteed only if there is a high
level of innovation  and investmenr.
Unfortunarely, industryt  gross invest-
ment rn llxec assets $ growlng more
slowly in the EU than in comparable
world-market  comDetitor countries.
\(&ilst the ayerage rate of growth for
the period l9B0 to l994wx 3.3o/o for
the USA and 5.60/o for Japan, for the
EU it amounted to a measre 2.0olo.
Europe is thus running thi risk of
being decoupled in the future from
worldwide growth  trends.
7 .2.1. 'fhe current  oroblems  of weak
level of growth and-rising unemploy-
ment will, in the ESCt view, not be
solved by postponing the beginning of
Monetarv  Union: what is needed is to
implement  a policy which reconciles
fiscal discipline,  economic growth and
employment poliry objectives,  on the
basis of the proposals set out in the
White Paper on Growth, Competitive-
ness and Employment  - The Challenges
and W'ays Forward into the 21" Centu-
ry. EMU must not be implemented
solely as a project for achieving  stabiliry,
in isolarion From the overal I economic
context. It is just as necessary to create
jobs which have a promising future and
to combat unemployment  as it is to
create  a zone of stability.
7 .3. In view of the serious labour-
market problems in the EU, the ESC
would refer once again to the guidelines
for structural reform of the labour mar-
kets adopted  by the Essen European
Council in 1994. These were:
.  improving employment  opportuni-
ties for the labour force bv oromot-
ing investmenr in vocational rrain-
lng;
.  raising the employment-intensive-
ness of growth;
.  reducing non-wage  labour costs;
9  See OECD: The OECDJobs Study. Facts, Analy-
sis, Strategies,  Paris 1994, pp. 19 et seq..  improving the effectiveness  of labour
market policy;
.  improving measures to help groups
which are particularly  hard hit by
rrnemnlnrrmanr
7 .3.L The linal communiqud  of the
Essen Surnmit callcd on the Member
States to submit programmes  for the
implementation  of these measures. 'fhe
ESC regrets that, so far, few Member
States have complicd with this call. The
ESC believes that the EU should moni-
tor the implementation  of employment-
promotion measures. As in the area of
frscal policy, the ESC considers that a
casc may be made for an additional
agreement requiring the Member  Statcs
to pay an employment lely in the event
of non-compliance with joindy adopted
labour-market  initiatives.
7.4. The solutions set out in Point
7 .3. above do not exhaust the range of
pos.ible EU employnrent-initiarive
measllres.  For cxample,  the ESC won-
dcrs whether structural  changes to the
taxation system  could servc the obiec-
tive of full e mployment.
7 .5.  The beginning of monetary
union in Europe will also bring changcs
in the field oFwages  policy. The ESo
points out that the free collective bar-
gaining berween employcrs  and workers
successfully  practised in many EU
Member States must retain its place in
F.uropearr economic Iife. The increasing
intcgratior-r of labour rnarl<ets  which
rvill accompany  nronetary union will
also require that transnational merger
rights be guaranteed.
7.6.  for rhe counrries  p.rrticiparing  in
monetary ur.rion, the introduction of
the single currcncy will mean the end
of the exchangc ratc as a mechanism  lbr
responding  to structural problems and
exogenous  shocks. If a currency cannot
be devalued, the main burden ofstruc-
tural adjustme nt will lall on wages and
prices. Finland provides  thc most recent
European  example olt this. Its exports
fell by approxim  xely 20o/o after thc
opening-up ofEastern Europe and the
Soviet Uniont entry into thc Common-
wcalth of Independent States (CIS).
Wirhout the subsequent drlnratit
devaluation o[ the markka, the Finnish
export industry would scarcely  have
been able to cope with the new condi-
trons.
7.6.I. External disnrrbances will have
serious  consequenccs  for growth  irnd
employment  as a result of the loss o[
international  price competitivcness.
Greater mobility  of labour is also neces-
sary in and between individual Member
States. 'lb promotc this movement, thc
ESC calls for financial support for mea-
sures to facilitate the taking-up of
employment  in another Member  Statc,
for examplc funding lor language cours-
es. It should also be noted that supple-
mentary company pension iusurancc
has consistently proved an obstacle to
mobility in the past. The ESC thcrefore
sees a need for at least partial tU har-
monization of such pcnsion arrange-ments. Migratory movements  must not,
of course, lead to structural discontinu-
ities in labour markets.
7.7. The dawn oF a new age in
Europe provides an opportunity to reor-
ganize the economic  policy decision-
making process. The ESC wishes in
particular  to be involved more directly
in the Broad Economic  Policl Guidrlines
adopted annually by the Ecofin Coun-
cil. This would be advisable  with a view
to the establishment  of a future regula-
tory framework for European wages
oolicv. The ESC is convinced that the
ipecial interests represented  within it
will enable it to make a useful contribu-
tion to regulatory questions in a Euro-
Dean monetary union. In thrs conrexr
ih. nSC wouid reiterate its calls made
in the report of 26 April 1995 on The
1996 Intergovernmental Conference
and the Role of the Economic and
Social Committee.
8.  Communicationmeasures
8.1. The only way to dispel any fears
over the practical aspects of implemen-
tation o[ the single currency  is to orga-
nize a flawless  communication  plan,
based on past experience.  At the
moment only some Member States
seem ro have provided for a communi-
cations budget in the run-up to the
introduction of the euro. The key words
here are integriry clariry transparency,
psychology, education.
8.1.1. From 1 Ianuary 2002 euro notes
and coins will Le in circulation  alone-
side existine notes and coins. The trin-
sition perio-d will last for no longer than
6 months. For a smooth chanseover ir
is vital rhar European citizensbe prop-
erlv informed orior to the event.
8.2. kssons must be drawn from past
experience.
8.2.1. French experience with the
chanseover lrom the old "qerminal"
Fr"nJto the new "pinay''fianc offers
many lessons. On 1 January 1960, the
old French franc was converted into the
new franc with 100 old francs making
up the new franc. 35 years on, many
French  people - including the media -
still calculate in the old currency.  Dur-
ing 1959, no specific communication
measures were taken to prepare for the
chanseover.  At the time of the
chan[eorrer in 1960, shopkeepers  wcre
told to ensure that any price display in
new francs was also accompanied  by the
corresponding amount in the old cur-
rency. The vear 1961 saw the introduc-
'tron ol the oblrgatron to add "NF"
(Nouveaux Fraics, or "new francs") to
the price, but there was no longer any
obligation to display the corresponding
amount in old francs.
8.2.1.1. The public had clearly not
been sufficiently  prepared; in fact, no
real information  campaign  seems to
have been envisaged  to prepare them for
the changeover. Up until January 1960,
very little information  seems to have
been available to explain the changeover
ano rts consecuences  to consumers.
This was, of cburse, prior to the media
boom, and bankers, public authorities
and teachers were under no obligation
to provide people with a clear message
in the run-up to the changeover from
old francs to new francs. Vith hind-
sight, it seems that the few steps taken
to familiarize people with the
changeover only served to encourage
mental complacency  rather than pro-
vide practical information.  Moreover,
the simoliciw of the conversion lrom
old francs to'new francs also encour-aged complacency. tVhen the consumer
is laced with a complex conversion rate,
he soon worls out his o*n value-scale
by fixing some reference  points in the
new currency. On the other hand, when
the exchange  rate is simple (knock off
two zeros),  the consumer  does not take
the trouble to get used to thc new
value, especiall for large sums of
monev which he mav not be used to
handling.
8.2.1.2. Since the conversion  was sim-
ple, the French government of the day
no doubt thought it superfluous to pro-
vide extra information  measutes a.fter
the changeover. It would now appear
that the simplicity of the conversion
rate should have made back-uo mea-
sures all the more necessary.
*  Visual information
Advenising hoardings,  shop-window
displays, n'ewspaperiand leaflets could
have provided efficient back-up.
*  Radio information
In 1960, few homes had fY  so
radio would have been the best way
ro orovide funher inFormation on
the changeover.
*  Information in schools
Teachers should have made children
and young people aware of the siru-
ario;. Th;v'would  have been able to
brine the message  home ro the fami-
ly, iri those dayi the family was
often more closely-knit.
*  Information  via business circles
Employers,  banks, public adminis-
tradons, etc. could have been
encouraged more to help spread the
message.
8.2.2. The British and lrish experience
in the changeover to decimal currenry
was quite different.
8.2.2.1. ln 1971. it took the United
Kinedom five days to switch to the dec-
imalcurrency.  The two currencies were
legal tender simultaneously for five days
only. The success oF the operation was
the fruit of considerable input in infor-
mation, training and education over a
tour-year penod.
8.2.2.2. Ireland, which chansed over
to a decimal currenry  at the sime time
as the UK, provides  an example of a
successfrrl com munication  campaign.
An inrensive informarion campaign  was
conducted ro ensure that the public
w_ere perfectly prepared for ttre
cnangeover.
8.2.2.3. ln January I971, a guide to
decimal .uri.n.y was disrribrited  free o[
charqe to every household in the coun-
trv. If provided brief, basic inFormation
for we:ryday shopping in decimal cur-
rency, lt dealt with the new coins; writ-
ine and pronouncins fisures in decimal
"ui..n.y; 
cheques;  bink"notes;  and dual
price display. ir included a copy oF rhe
orice conversion tables for the mosr
common  purchases. A larqe-scale  adver-
tising carnpaign  used the [ress, TV and
radio. buses. and billboards in streets
throughout the country. The campaign
had mo main aims: to point out the
need to read "Everyonet  guide to deci-
mal currency'', and to provide people
with very simple information to prepare
them For the changeover.
8.2.2.4. TY and radio programmes
comPnseo:
.  a number of TV and radio discus-
sions in which members of the eov-
ernmenr gave inFormarion and "
advice on-the various aspects of the
cnangeover;o  a series of short programmes  pro-
duced by RIE and broadcast on the
radio in January 79771
.  a series of three short educational
programmes  produced by RTE and
broadcast on TV These TV pro-
grammes were repeated  several times
Iurins the three weeks before the
changiot er to decimal currency.
8.2.2.5. Special  measures were taken to
helo the elderlv and the disabled. Vari-
ous members of women's associations,
local thinktanks,  etc. were provided
with information by government offi-
cials. This meant that they in turn
could provide basic information on the
coming changeover to the various
branches of their associations  through-
out the country.
8.2.3. Bearing in mind the above expe-
riences and accompanying  analysis,  a
large-scale informarion campaign
should be organized, specially adapted
to rhe specific  needs of the euro, in
order to prepare for the changeovcr.
The campaign will also have to be
accompanied by back-up measures for a
limited time.
8.3. In order to ensure a successful
changeover the information campaign
should cenrre on rhe European  citizen
(bank stafi administration,  employers
and employees,  consumers, teachers,
family unit, etc.), gathering momentum
and harnessing the "trickle-dorun" effects
of the relationihios  between the differ-
ent users of the currency.
8.3.1. An overview of the impact of the
introduction of the euro -uri b. oro-
vided from the ourset. Ve must first
allay all the fears people have concern-
ing anfoss of.nationality-  abandon-
ment of sovereignry  rise in unemploy-
ment, price increases, etc. Simple, prac-
tical information  must therefore  be dis-
seminated,  unlike the information
made available for the referendum on
the Maastricht Tieary.
8.3.2. Surveys have generally shown
that people have a positive atti de
towards the introduction of the sinele
currency, bur wish more general inf6r-
mation were available.  The round table
discussions  organized by the European
Comnrission on 22-24 Jantery 1996
revealed that old people, housewives  and
people who have a sedentary  lifesryle
will be rhe mosr difilcult secrions  to
convince  that the chanseover to the
euro is both important-and  necessary.
The fact is that these people use curren-
cy as a means of payment, but only
rarely carry out ffansactions  involving
currency  exchange,  unlike some profes-
sional people, for example. Everything
thus depends  on how far people are
involved in financia.l dealings.
8.3.3. The speed with which people
adapt to the new system will depend  on
rhe difficulry  of the arithmetic in trans-
lating national currency into euros. For
example, in order to change French
francs into euros, the calculation should
involve dividing by 7 (approx.). This issomcwhat  similar to the calculation
involved in converting  Belgian  francs
into French francs. Experience  has
shown that French people who havc
lived in Belgium for many years connn-
ue to think in the currency they used
when they were growing up. The
upshot of this is that whilst the conver-
sion from French francs into euros will
pr obably be a simple operation.  it
might run up against the problem of
mental complacency  which arose previ-
ously. But lor each country, conversion
will be a specific operation, involving
varying degrees of complexity.
8.4. The approach  involved will differ
according  to the degree of Frequency of
rhe various purchases.  A disrinction
should be drawn berween three types oF
purchase: frequent, everyday purchases
(foodstuffs, newspapers,  petrol, etc.);
"one-off"  purchases (car, house, etc.);
and "intermediate"  purchases (clothes,
furniture, electrical goods, etc.).
8.4.I. For everyday and "one-off" pur-
chases, the changeovcr to the euro
should not pose any major problem. As
far as everyday purchases  are concerned,
the fact that the housewife  often buys
rhe same producrs  will m.rke ir casier
fbr her to adjust to the new value scale,
sincc she will not have to rnodify her
consumer  patterns.
8.4.2. "One-off" purchases  occur so
infrequently  that the consumer  does
not rely on habit or any relerence scale
when shopping around. In this respect,
the changeover to the single currency
will not be dramatic. The consumer
will only choose  the product  on the
basis of research carried out at the time,
and thercfore in the currency which is
legal tender at the time of the purchase.
8.4.3. On the other hand, in the case of
"intermediate"  purchases,  the consumer
will have a greater tendency  to convert,
so as to establish a value scale and in
order to enable hirn to call upon con-
sumer experience  with a view to facili-
rating price tomparisons and raking
advantage of competition.
8.4.4. tVhen thc switch to the euro
takes place, information campaigns will
have to pay special attention  to this
aspect, and compensate lor thc infre-
quency of "intermediate"  purchases  by
providing clear price displays for the
products.  Thus, the consumer will get
used to the new currency thanks to an
awareness of the pricc ranges of the
products rather than through  direct
experience of huyirrg. In all rhe ahove
caics, checks wili ha.-u. to be carricd our
to avoid hidden price riscs, since the
Force of competition may not be suffi-
cient to prevent them.
8.5. Iflong-term preparation is to be
effective, it should start now or, at the
latest by the year 2000. 'l'he date is
important psychologically - a new cur-
rency for the new millenniurn. In order
to fit in wirh the schedule set <.rut in the
< - preparatory measures - >Tieaty, the communication  measures
should begin on a large scale one year
after the actual launch of Monetary
Union (introduction of the euro, fixing
of conversion  rates) on I January 1999.
8.5.1. This would eive banks and
administrations tinie to adiust to the
new currency. The extra costs ensuing
from the obligation  to inform should
thus be financially  acceptable.
8.5.2. The preparatory measures will
have to end on 31 December  2001 - on
the eve of the introduction  of the euro -
and be replaced by back-up measures.
8.5.3. This advance inFormation con-
cerns the intermediaries  and certain sce-
narios which should be envisaged.
8.6. Preparation through intermedi-
artes
8.6.i. The information campaign
should be carried out by local operators,
which are in the best oosition to deal
with business circles and individual citi-
zens, and should be geared to the spe-
cific needs of the user (consumer, tax-
payer, employee, job-seeker, social secu-
rity contributor, elector, small business,
shopkeeper, etc.). Intermediaries should
not be contacted  individually; rather,
existing  inter-relationships should be
exoloited to the full in order to enhance
thi effecr of the information campaign,
by harnessing  what could be called the
'lrichle-doun ffict".
8.6.2. Thus, the authorities would
inform the bani<s, who would inform
the cusromer, who would inform
friends and relatives, and so on.
a Authorities
Any information or papers from
national authorities containing  sums
expressed in figures must adviie the
reader of the change.  The term
"authorities"  must include social
security departments (with which
the user has frequent dealings),  the
Post Ofiice, tax authorities,  the
police, the law courts, chambers of
commerce  and local authorities.
Emphlers and em?Wes
Every firm will have to organize its
own staff training programme, paid
for oartlv from its own resources and
pardy from external  funding from
the state or the EU. Tiade unions
can carry out excellent work in the
field of communication by means of
tnelr trarnrng programmes.
Distributiue  trade staff
Special attention should be devoted
to this sector. Customers  will often
ask check-out assistants for help
with prices. Consequently, intensive
training courses must be provided
for them in advance.
Banh staff
Bank staffwill have to have more
intensive training, since they will have
to understand the changes in onder to
be able to carry out their work, and
also, more importandy, to explain the
process  to tnef customers.
Tbachers
A soecial effort must be made in
schbols, particuiarly  with the
youngest  pupils who are not yet
used to handling  money, and for
whom the euro will be their first
and onlv national currencv.  For
older pupils, the teacher will have to
adapt and step up the examples.
Vhen calculating the cost of the
"shopping basket".  the arithmetic
should be expressed in euros.f
Cenerally speaking, an information
campaign  for schools - from primary
school to the sixth-form college -
will have to be set up wirh Co--u-
nity support  (along the lines of the
LEONARDO  programme). Com-
muniry suppoft could also extend to
encouraging  schools to make sure
that internal  financial  transactions.
such as those involving photocopies,
school equipment,  snacks, fund rais-
ing events for school trips, etc., can
only be carried out in euros. The
same kind of Community  support
could also be used to establish a
European  prize for the best idea for
information on the introduction of
the euro. Only schools  would be
allowed to compete  and a prize
would go to the winning school.
Consumer associations
These could act as excellent so-
betweens  for the oublic auth"orities
and consumers, providing sirnple,
easy-to-understand  information.
The more the information  reflects
dailv life. the more the consumer
will'feel involved. All consumer
publications  and TV programmes
should focus regularly on the switch
to the single currency.
Ti'auel agencies
Since the introduction  of the euro
will do away with currency  exchange
between countries  which adopt the
single currency,  travel agents should
be encouraged to help tourists
understand the benefits that the
introduction  of the euro brings to
their everyday life.
Tbe media
'Vhen France held a referendum on
the Tieaty on European  Union, the
former Eurooean  Commission  Presi-
dent, Mr Jacques DELORS, felt that
it was not the Communiryt  job to
provide information and adverrising
for the new Treary.  Consequently,
Maastricht's detractors  had no orob-
lem in putring forward often fa]se
arguments  to discredit the Commis-
sion's efforts in this area.
Here again, we must learn from the
past. The Commission  must get
involved and provide funding For
information on the transition  to the
euro, even though  the ideal commu-
nication level must most definitely
be as close as oossible ro rhe citizen.
This Commission  action could take
different forms, e.g. adopting com-
munications  designed to provide
encouragemenr,  binding provisions,
programmes  with targeted funding,
etc. Commission  intervention is
needed not because the Member
States shirk their responsibilities,  but
because only the Commission  can
provide the necessary coordination.
The success of the switch to the
euro deoends on coordinated com-
municaiion berween rhe different
Member  States. This coordination
reouires idenrical communication
m&rt,res to be introduced  simulta-
neously in the Member  Stares join-
ing the single currency, and also in
those with a derogation.
The Commission  should enlist the
support of the media. It might sug-
gest a national measure to encourage
the press to pnnt a countdown to
the switch. In the same wav. TV
game show producers  could be
encouraged to express  prize money
ln eufos.
Still in the field of television, arm-
c.
h.chair shopping programmes  should
give prices in both currencies, and
make arrangements for rapidly  phas-
ing out the national currency, leav-
ing the price in euros only.
Finally, advertisers (TV, hoardings,
radio, newspapers)  should be
encouraged ro display prices in
euros.
8.6.3. The Economic and Social Com-
mittee could constitute a very effective
instrument  for publicizing a pro-
gramme for promoting the introduc-
tion ofthe euro, such as that launched
by the Commission.
8.7. Preparation through dual price
display
8.7.1. Dual price display  is considered
as one of the oossible  wavs to familiar-
ize consumeri w.ith the new currencv: it
could serve ro educate Lhe public. In
order to take account of the specific
characteristics of national markets,
arrangments in respect of dual display
should be determined at national level,
in accordance  with the principle of sub-
sidiarity. Prices should be displayed in
both currencies for all everyday transac-
uons.
8.7.2. Dual. display of retail prices is
designed.to ensure that whenever  a.
PflCe  15 grven rn naflonal currency, rts
equivalent  in euros should appear
beside it. This measure  means that for
each product, four different values
would be displaved on the same label.
This is because  1997 will see the entry
into force of the Directive on orice dis-
play by unit sold and by unit of volume
or weight. Legibiliry and feasibiliry
problems  may arise here.
8.7.2.1. Since 1 September  1985, the
French experience  oF displaying prices
by unit and volume for pre-packed
products sold in stores larger than
120m'has shown that French con-
sumers became  used to reading two
prices without any difficulry. Having
several prices on the same label should
not worry consumers too much,  espe-
cially since the obligation will be limit-
ed to two and a half years.
8.7.2.2. Training will have to be pro-
vided for sales staff dealins with the
sums involved and cash-hindling
machines will have to be adaoted. As
mentioned  above,  check-out  issistants
will need prior training in order to be
able to answer the various ouestions
customers will most certainiy ask them.
Cash registers will have ro be adapted
to provide a receipt in both currencies,
at least for the total fisure. 'When
adapting them for thJduai display
requirement, they could be pro-
grammed  from the outset to issue a
ieceipt giving the price of each article
in euros, but the total in both curren-
cies. This would avoid the need to
adapt the cash registers  several times.
Thus, in pracdce, until 1 January 2002
when the euro comes into circulation,
consumers will use national currency to
pay prices displayed in nadonal curren-
cy and in euros. The advantage of this
is that at the end of the dual orice dis-
play stage on 30 June 2002, cish regis-
rers will nor have ro be radically adiust-
ed once again. It will be sufficient  io
erase the faciliry allowing conversion
and printing of the total in national
currency, and leave the operation in
euros only.
8.7 .3. lt is vital for the consumer  to
establish a link between income and
outgoings iF he is to get used to retail
prices expressed in euros. Spending
power will not be affected by the intro-duction o[ the euro, but reassurance
must be provided in this respect.
Accordingly, binding provisions should
be introduced  at Community  lwel to
ensure that payslips mention wages in
national currency and euros. This
should accompany  the introduction  of
the dual display of retail prices.
8.7.4. Special amention should be paid
to the dual display of banking services:
-  account  statements should give the
figures for debit and credit in both
cuffenctesi
-  cheque books: although  cheques
would sdll be made out in nationd
currenry, they could carry a conver-
sion table on t}re reverse.sidel
-  documentation  in respect of loans
should give the amounts in both
currencresi
-  documentation  in respect of securi-
ties should give the amounts in both
currencres;
-  automatic cash dispensers will have




the equ'ivalent in euros.
8.7.5. From I January 2002, cash dis-
pensers will have to be adjusted to dis-
p.nse euros only, and the receipt should
show the equivalent in national curren-
ry until 30 June 2002. Persons wishing
to withdraw cash in national currency
will have to go directly to the bank
counter. Vith effect from 1 September
2002. cash dispensers will only be able
to issue receipts showing withdrawals in
euros.
8.7.6. As regards the dual display of all
documents  from the authorities, the
term "authorities"  should be understood
in a broad sense.  as was the case in ear-
lier sections of this Ooinion. All tax
documents (declarations,  stamps, fines,
etc.) and social securiry documents
should give equivalenti in euros.
8.7 .7 . There are two types of repercus-
sions in connection with the introduc-
tion of the dual displav: technical and
financial.
8.7.7.1. First of all, the dual display
requirement means that a 
"ery 
laige
n,t-b.. of machines will have to 5e
adjusted:  cash registers,  cash dispensers,
etc. Soecial new ioftware will hive to be
developed for rhis. However,  given the
limited "shelf-life"  o[ sofrware, those
developed in 1996 will be almost  obso-
lere by 2002. Thus, it is imporrant to
sause the risht momenr for brinsine in
the new soltware  to deal wltn tne new
data and requirements  resulting from
the inrroduction of the euro.
8.7.7.2. The costs involved in imple-
menrins  the dual display requiremint
should  "not be overlooked.  These will be
connected  with the ourchase and tai-
lored installation  ofihe software, staff
traininq, and losses due to conversion
error (ihe decimal problem).  In order to
encourage economic oDerators  to make
the neceisary preparations  for dual dis-
play, the public authorities could allow
iax'relief  and rax deductions on rhe
technical investments  needed for the
switch to the euro. The consumert
share of the changeover costs should be
kept to the bare minimum.
8.8. After the switch on 1 January
2002, the preparatory measures out-
lined above will be replaced by short-
term back-up measures lor a maxmum
period of six months.
8.8. l. This period will coincide wirh
the date ser Tor circulation  oF the euro
(1 January 2002) and withdrawal ofnational currencies (1 July 2002 at the
latest). The main change during the
back-up  period will be reversal of dual
price display. During the preparatory
period, the price in national currency
will be followed by the euro-price,
whereas during the back-up period,
prices will be displayed in euros first,
and then in the national currency  for
information only. The back-up mea-
sures will take over from the preparato-
ry measures and cover the same aspects.
8.8.2. As of I January 2002, wages
must be paid in euros, but payslips will
also show the amount in national cur-
rency, for information only. Prize
money from betting, lotteiies, etc. will
have to be paid out in euros.
8.8.3. As regards banking services, cash
disoensers will onlv alow withdrawals in
euios. Cheques  wiil have to be made
out in euros, but a "round figure" con-
version table could be keot on the back
of the cheque.
9.  Summary
9.1. The ESC welcomes the olanned
monetarv union in Eurooe which will
make a fi,rndamenta.l  contriburion  ro
bringing about a Europe which is closer
to the citizen, more highly respected  at
inrernational  level and in a berter posi-
tion to create iobs and wealth within its
boundaries.
9.2. In order to make the conversence
monitoring process transparent, th;
convergence  criteria must be applied
clearly (see Points 2.4. and 2.7 .).
9.3. It is the Council which will final-
ly make a political  assessment  of the
achievements of the Member States
with a view to deciding whether they
are to be admitted  to the third stase of
EMU. Too small a group of Member
States would not justi6/ the high costs
associated with introduction  of the new
currency,
9.4. The ESC recommends  that
countries which fail to meet only one of
the five converqence criteria be exam-
ined again on ihe basis of real conver-
gence cfltefla.
9.5. Exchanse rates should be set at a
level which eniures that speculative dis-
tortions have no lasting impact during
tne transrtron to monetafy  unron.
9.6. The ESC considers it essentially
counter-productive  to assume that
departure lrom rhe convergence princi-
ples as a result of circumstances beyond
government control can be penalized  by
financial  sanctions.
9.7. As regards the deroga.tion  coun-
tries. the ESC would draw oarticular
attent.ion  to the adverse consequences  of
their long-term  exclusion frorn EM U,
especially against the background of F.[J
enlargement.
9.8. The ESC would like to see an
inflation target published in the future
single currenry  area. An intermediate
monetary target shou.ld be a main plank
of rhe p,CB s'monerary poliry. In order
to make money-market control more
effective  the ESC would like to see a
minimum reserve requirement applied
to deposits with commercial bania,
attracting  a rate of interest  close to the
market rate.
9.9. The ESC urges that monetary
relations  berween rhe core group oF
Member  Stares participaring in the
third stage of monetary union and the
other Member  States be resulated in
order ro (a) guarantee the conrinued
smooth ooeration of the internal mar-ket, (b) ensure  a high degree of
exchange-rate stability between the sin-
gle currenry and the national  currencies
and (c) facilitate the non-participating
countries' subseouent transition to the
single currency. 
-
9.10. \7ith these aims in view; the
ESC supports  rhe establishment  of an
exchange-rate  mechanism on rhe lines
of the EMS in which the single curren-
ry would act as an anchor.
9.11. In view of the hieh level ofstruc-
tural unemployment  in the EU, the
ESC calls for the obiective of frrll
employment  to be accorded greater pri-
oriry in European  economic policy.
9.12. The ESC would remind  the gov-
ernments  of the Member  States of the
zuidelines for structural reforrn of the
labour markets adopted  bv the Essen
EuroDean summit. Th. ESC t.qt.tt
that io far few Member States hirve sub-
mitted programmes  for the implemen-
tation o[ these measures.
9.13. The ESC points out that the free
collecrive  bareainine between employers
and workers ir...rif,.tlly  practised it
many EU Member States must rerain
its place in European  economic life.
9.14. The introduction  of the euro will
require a number of back-up measures
to pr.p"t. those working in the various
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sectors involved and the public at large.
Both the preparatory measures and the
back-up measures taken aFter the intro-
duction o[rhe euro will have to be
geared to the target groups. In the
ESCI view. we should draw on the
French experience (with the introduc-
tion of the new franc) and the UK and
Irish experience (with the introduction
of decimal currencv) in order to ensure
that citizens are pripared for the
changeover in good time.
9.15. Ifthe changeover is to take place
under optimd conditions,  the first step
which nieds to be taken is to launch 
-
information campaigns. Special  roles
could be played here by administra-
tions, employers  and employees, staff in
the distributive trades, bank staff con-
sumer associations  and, indeed, by the
ESC. The media have a vital role to
play; rhey should be encouraged to
issue a countdown to the changeover. in
the interests ofthe general public.
9.16. Dual display (national currency
followed by the euro in the run-up to I
January  2002 and the euro followed by
narional currency posr I January 2002)
in respect of prices. wages and contri-
bution sl.ips - which should also rake
account oT rhe soecific characteristics of
national marketi - could help con-
sumers to avoid confusion.
The Acting Secretary-General
of the
Economic and Social Committee
Carlos Ferrer Adriano GraziosiRapporteur: Robert Pelletier (France - Employeurs)
Opinion adopted  on l0 December 1997
The communication  submitted  for the
Committee  opinion is the rcsult of the
work of a group of experts chaired by
Mr A. Giovannini. It sets out technical
recommendations on the redenomina-
tion of the bond, equity and derivative
matkets  and on thc market conventions
which should be applied to the new
euro capital market.
1.  General  comments
I .1 .  The importance of market con-
ventions, i.e. self-regulation by profes-
sionals, should be stressed.  This is why
the Commission  has wisely decided to
rely to a great extcnt on exPerl opinion.
1.1.1. The approach adopted by the
Commission is in response to the mar-
kcts' expressed  preFerence for recommen-
dations rather than a regulation. The
experts from the various Member States
have drawn up a series of technical  rec-
ommcndations summariz-ing  the views
of operators on the .legrce of harmon iza-
r ion'needed lor rhe establishment of a
euro capital market which will be as liq-
uid and as transparent as possible.
1 .2.  -I'he approach  is pragmatic and
progressive and takes account of the
different practicesr conventions and
national itandards which still apply in
the domestic markets and somc of
which will necessarily  continue  aFter 4
Janmry 1999.
1.2.1. ln this respect the Commission
is to be congratulated for havtng con-
d.,cted num"erous  consultations-with
prolessional  organizations rep resen ting
market operators.
7.3. The consultations carried out by
rhe Economic and Social Committee
have in most cases confirmed  the line
taken by the Commission. This con-
firms that market operators have an
international and common view of the
operation of the markets for bonds,
fiied-intercsL.  equ it ies, Jerivatives  etc.
1.4. In view of the many technical
quesrions tackled by the Commission'.s
communication and in order to avoid
making rhe opinion too long, the Eco-
nomic"antl  Social Commirre-e  has
decided to address only questlons to
which it can bring "added value". If a
problem  has not been mentioned,  thisimplies that the Committee  endorses
the solution  adopted  by the Commis-
slon.
1.5. The Commission communica-
tion clearly explains the very complex
processes  involved in introducing the
euro on caoital markets. The Economic
and Social Committee  consratulates  the
Commission on having plaied this
asDect ot monetary unlon ln a more
general  perspective in its recent com-
munication' on the practical aspects of
introduction of the euro.
1.6. The latter document is a fifting
complement  to tlre communication c-ur-
renrly under discussion,  in that ir
addresses  various  legal problems connecr-
ed with the euro, lax, accounting  etc.
2.  Specific comments
2.1. The bond market
2.1.1.ln December 1995 the Madrid
European Council decided that from
the start of staqe three of EMU all new
tradable publiJdebt  would be issued in
euros. TFis was a precondition  for the
adootion of the euro bv the financial
mark.ts  on 4 Tanuary i999. This deci-
sion was not in itself sufficient however.
The main countries  have since
announced  that they would also convert
a significant part oftheir outstanding
debt into euros after this date, thus cre-
ating a critical mass likely ro guaranree
the liquidiry  of the markets and a
bench mark yield curve lor euro interesr
rates. To date France and Belgium have
confirmed  that they will conv"en rheir
public debt into euros. Germany adopt-
ed a draft law in the Council of Minis-
terc on 24 September  1997 enabbng
DM 730 bn. to be denominated in
euros. This would orovide oDumum
conditions  for the operation of the repo
and derivative markets, with a solid
foundation of euro-denominated  securi-
ties.
2.1.2. ln some Member  States however
certain issues of government debt made
available to the g"eneral public will con-
dnue ro be denominated in the national
currency.
2.1.3.In most Member  States therefore
the liquidiry, (ransparency and efficien-
cy oF rhe government bond market will
be enhanced bv the ouotation and set-
tlement  of neeotiable debt instrumenrs
and bonds iniuros. The conversion  of
negotiable  public debt is certain to be
followed by that of major corporate
bonds.  Less licuid and smaller  issues
will however rimain denominated in
the national currency until their matu-
rlry.
The main conaersion  methods
2.1.4. The fact that conversion ro rhe
euro will not yield a round number will
pose considerable problems of adapta-
tion for firms, individuals and markets.
It is lor example difficulr to envisage
securities with a nominal value contain-
ing two figures after the decimal point.
This kind of amount will not make it
easier for physical  persons to conduct
marker transacrions.  Many cou ntries
will therefore,  after conveision to the
nearest cent, have ro round up to units
oF I euro, l0 euros or 100 euros.
I  COM(97)  491, I October  1997.  See  also ESC
opinion  on this communication  (CES 1406/97,
l1 December  1997).2.1.5. The Economic and Social Com-
mimee  therefore  considers that the
method of rounding to the nearest cent
could be used for the redenomination
of negotiable  debtr another possibiliry
*n,rli b. renominalization  with the 
'
payment of compensation. Both meth-
ods have their advantages.
2.1.5.1. National measures should
however be taken to orevent  bond-
holder.s from being ptndized  in the
area of taxatron.
2.1.6. Redenomination  on the basis of
individual  bonds
A bond with a national currency
unit value of 2000 could be rede-
nominated, in the case of France
for example, as a bond with a value
o[ euro il2.60 , i.e. 200016.39795
(conversion factor to five decimal
places) rounded to the nearest
cent.
One consequence of this operation
is that the amount of outstanding
debt in euros would not be a whole
number.
2.1.7. Redenomination  on the basis of
a fixed minimum denomination with
cash compensatory payments
To take a French  example  again. a
bond with a national currenry unit
value of 2000 is converted into 312
bonds with a nominal value of euro
l  i.e. 2000/6.39795 (conversion
factor to five decimal places) with
the payment of cash compensation
of6b ients. The result ofrhis oper-
ation is that the amount of out-
standinE  debt in euros would be a
whole nlumber, which would
enhance licuidiw and make it easier
for the pubiic to understand the
conversron.
The securities  would then be quoted
in multiples  of euro I ( | 00, I ,b00
etc.) and- negotiated on the basis of
a capital amount in multiples of
euro r.
2.1.8. \(hatever method is chosen, it
will entail roundins.  There are four lev-
els at which the im-pact of rounding
will have to be taken into account:
.  individualportfolios
.  DorrFolios  at financial institution
Ievel
'  depositories
.  global volume of securities issued.
2.1.9. The preferred method of the
group is the botrom-up method. One
6f th" 
"duantaees 
o[ this method is that
there is no cha].g. in the value of an
issue and that th"e risk of rounding
errors is reduced as each individual
holding is converted. Contrary to what
the communication suggests, redenomi-
nation on the basis of a fixed minimum
denomination  with cash compensatory
payments  is a borrom-up method. This
analysis  should be correcred in rhe
communication.
2. 1 . 10. The three other methods
described in the report are as far as we
know the least used.
2.1.11. The survey carried out by the
European  Banking Federation  confirms
that ihe Member  States are in the
process oF adopting  the detailed meth-
ods lor the converston  ot government
debt. It is essential that thi Commis-
sion collect technical information,  the
^cctracy 
of which has been confirmed
by each of the Member  States, and dis-
seminate this widely.2,2. Market conventions
2.2.1. Market conventions need to be
harmonized in order to increase effi-
cienry and transparency.
2.2.2. The main conventions concern:
.  day counts
.  coupon frequency
.  business days
.  euro settlement  basis.
The professional  associations  represent-
ing these markets have defined market
conventions  which command a broad
consensus and which will rapidly
become points of reference  for the sin-
gle market.
2.2.3. The recommendations  put for-
ward by the communication  on these
variou.s points are welcome  but will, lor
example in the case of business days,
require national legislation. Moreover,
the communication  righrly poinrs our
that harmonization will ginerate cosrs
and cause delays.
2.3. The equity markets
2.J.I . These markets are more sensirive
in thar rhey display grearer diversiry
lrom one Member Stare ro another
than the fixed-interest markets. They
concern a large number of small savers
who have invested in securities either
directly or via collective investment
vehicles.
2.J.2. Howcver, the basic assumption is
that a single currency  will be used for
quotations,  lor legal reasons, but also in
the interests of simpliciry and public
comprehension.
2.3.3.It should be made easier for
comDanies to redenominate their shares
in euros. This will no doubt deoend
more on the,development of euro
accoun ng tnan on quotauon rn euros.
It would however be desirable for the
conversion  of share capital into euros to
be done in as flexible a way as possible.
National legislation could be enacted to
enable boards of directors to decide, if
they so wish, to convert their company's
share caoital into euros, without the
need to;onvene  a general meering of
shareholders.
2.3.4. A company wishing to redenom-
inate its shares in euros has four
options:
.  to leave shares indefinitely with a
par value of unrounded  euros:
.  to convert the share par value
rounding to the nearest cent;
.  to change the par value to a round
number of euros and have a com-
mon nominal  value:
.  to move to non par value shares.
2.3.4.1. In view of the diversiry of the
laws governing changes  in share capiral,
a recommendaf ton confernng  powefs
on general meetinp,s of sharetolders or
boaids of direcrors"in rhis regard would
be welcome.
2,3,5, The Economic and Social Com-
mittee would like to see the introduc-tion of non par value shares encour-
aqed. Lesislation in this field is in
piog..rrl.t each oF the Member  States
and-this should be encouraged.
2.3.6. lnits general .or,ridJr*,io.,, ort
rhe equiw markets the Commission
.iehrly notes that "issuers  tend to focus
m"ainly on their national  share market".
2.3.7. On the other hand, the assertion
that "the introduction  of the single cur-
rency and the disappearance  o[
exchange  rate risk in the euro area will
not, at ieast in the short term, modi$,
rhe existing relation between issuers
and their iomestic markets" should be
qualified.
2.3.8. Independendy ofthe effort to
increase comoetition  made via the
investment services directive, the conse-
quences should not be underestimated
oF opening up a large euro market with
international  issuance standards  and
touqher requirements  on issuers with
r"gid to quotation. lodging of
accounts, profitability ratios, advertising
of issues; ihese will have the effect of -
drivine lrom rhe market medium-sized
companies unable ro withstand  rhe.
compefltron trom large companles ln
th. euro market, rhus'losing-their  tradi-
donal access to the national market,
2.3.9. The impact of the international-
ization of the iuro market on condi-
tions for the financing  of small and
medium-sized European  enterprises
merits more detailed  study by the com-
petent authorities.
2.4, The derivative markets
2.4.1 . The main oroblem here is conti-
nuiw of contract. The adoption  of two
Council resulations on thd introduc-
tion of the"euro' will help establish a
solid leeal basis for the siart of the third
stage. Some countries, e.g. the USA,
have legislated in this area.
2.4.2. The Committee  welcomes the
leeal analvses undertaken by the Com-
-lsion *hi.h confirm thai by virtue of
the "lex monetae"  a legal principle rec-
oqnized on all major financial markets.
tlie continuiry oF contracts  expressed in
currencies  replaced by the euro should
also be guaranteed in non-member
countriJs. This analysis remains how-
ever to be confirmed  in some smaller
countries.
2.4.3. k would be a good idea for the
Commission  to undertake a large-scale
communication campaign  to inform
non-EU countries as to the real nature
oF these problems so as fo prevent com-
mercial misundersrandines.
2.5.  Price sources
2.5.1. Several national panels are in the
process oF constructing  market price
indicators. Eventuallv,  with the intro-
ducdon of the euro, price sources in
national currencies wlll disappear.
2.5.2. The associations representing
credit institutions and market operators
have created a EURIBOR.  Simiiarly,
2  Council  Reeulation (EC) No ll03/97 of 17 June
1997 on cerlain provisions  relating to the intro-
duction ofthe eLiro  (adooted  on the basis ofArti-
cle 235 of the Tieaty), OJ No L 162 of 19 June
1997.
Proposal for a Council  Regularion  on rhe inrroduc-
rion of rhe euro (approuedby  rhe C,ouncil  on 7
ILrly 1997; the regilation will be adopted  on the
'basis 
of futicle l69l(4) of rhe Trerry as mon  as rhe
decision  as to the Member States adopting the
euro  has been  taken) OJ No C 236 of 2 August
1997.the Eurooean Monetarv  Institute has
agreed to calculate a EURIMEAN
which would be disseminated  via the
European  Banking Federation. AII the
protesslonal organlza  ons represenf  I n g
credit institutions are involved in the
setting up ofpanels  representative of
pllce soufces.
2.5.3. The principle of creating  new
Drice sources for the euro zone based on
i sample  of banks representative of the
zone will provide a European  bench-
mark for i.* 
"orrtr".t, 
fiom 1999
onwards. It would be a good thing for
domestic  price sources t"o di."pp.i. in
Member States where national law
allows this oa if they continue,  for
them not to be widelv oublicized. This
is a precondition  for ihi creation of a
single financial  market.
2.5.4.The principle of continuity of
contract does not mean that exisring
price sources should continu. to apply
after 4 January 1999 providing rhit
there iia new orice sour.. .loi. to ,h.
old one which can be substituted.
2.6.  Reserve requirements3
2.6.1. Considerable  efforts are beins
made to ensure that the caoital -"r"k tt
are efficient. The imoosition of reserve
requiremenrs  would iorally compromise
the establishment  of a unihed eiro ."o-
iral market.
2.6.2. -lhe Economic and Social Com-
mittee must point out the risk, if this
were done, of business moving to euro
markets nor subject to reservelequire-
ments. It is parricularly worrying that
rhe establishment  of a-sinsle 
'finincial
market in euros should be"penalized
and that for regulatory reasons the euro
market should have to develon outside
rhe. counrries  parriciparing  in iconomic
ano monetary unlon.
2.7. Tirx
2.7.1. The Economic  and Social Com-
mittee shares the Commissiont view
that "regardless  of the level of harmo-
nization  achieved in terms of market
conventions and practices there will still
be distortions  resulting from differences
in national  tax regimes".
2.7.2. Howeven the Economic and
Social Committee does not consider it
oossible to wait until the introduction
of th. ..tto has created a general aware-
ness of the distortions  to ieek a solution
to a situation which has become unac-
ceptable in terms of competition.
2.7 .2.1. Accordingly, the Economic
and Social Committee stresses the sis-
nificance oF dre measures recentlv D;-
posed by the Commission  whictr will
inter alia oroduce  a code of conduct
designed io pr.rrent harmful competi-
tron ln tne area ot taxatlon,
3.  Conclusion
3.1. The Economic and Social Com-
mittee would like to highlight  the qual-
iry of the communication referred for
its opinion. It hopes that the Commis,
sion will in future continue  to be euid-
ed by the desire to keep abreast of-the
concerns of market operators,  rather
than imposing  rules which in all likeli-
hood would lag behind the practices of
the orofessionals.
3  See also opinion ofthe Economic and Social Com-
mitLcr o[ 24 March 199j on minimum reserves in
the context ofthe internal market (rapporteur: Mr
Meyer-Horn),  OJ No. C 129 (p. l0) bT tO May
1993.3.1.1. The initiatives  taken by the rep-
resentative prolessionaJ associations
demonstrate  their abiliry to ciury out
the harmonization  of orofessional  rules
necessarv for the development of a
tr"rrrp"tbnt  and liquid financial market
for tfie euro.
3.2. The Economic and Social Com-
m ittee srresses the need to monitor,
almost on a day-to-day basis, the devel-
opment of maiket practices, which are
constandy changing.
3.3. Drawing on its members' know-
how the Economic and Social Com-
mirtee could provide the Commission
with detailed technical assistance on
oroblems  related to the introduction of
ih. .'.tto on the markets which remain
to be resolved.  The Committee  would
like to be involved throughout the
process of introducing the euro.
Brussels, 10 December 1997.
The President
of the




Economic and Social Committee
Adriano Graziosi
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59,Opinion adopted I I December 1997
1.  Introduction
1 . l  The communication in question
was oresenred  bv the Commission  ro
the Ecofin Council meetins in Luxem-
bourg on 13 October 1997; an updated
version will be oresented at the Luxem-
bours Summit bn 12- 1 3 December
1997. This document contains infor-
mation on the practical PreParations
implemented.  in the Member Stares
and at EU level, in the run-up ro adop-
tion ofthe euro. It also indicates  the
decisions that still have to be taken
within a very tight dmespan:  basically,
by the end oF 1997.
1.2. This "progress report" on work
in preparation For the introduction of
the euro establishes  a link with the
I 995 Green Paper' and the decisions
taken at the Midrid European  Council
on 15-16 December 199i. The Eco-
nomic and Social Committee has issued
several opinions', both on this subject
and a number of specific  issues.
1.3. In view of the urgency  of draw-
ing up with all speed the opinron
1  COM(95)  333 6nal
2  Ooinion of26 October 1995 on the " Green
Pa\er on the Dractiral anangements  lor the
inhodurtion'of  the single rzireary"ri  )l No t  l8
of22  January  1996)
Opinion of 28 Septembcr  1996 ot 'Tlte impact
oiEconomic  and Moneurv  Union: Economic
inrl socia! aspeus  ofconvirgence and measures lo
inerease awirorcss'of  the single currenry" rol
No. C 30 of30  January  1997)
Ooinion of 3l October 1996 on t|:,e "Marbet
imolicaions of rhe lzrishtion and regulaions
reiuired for tltc traniition  to tbc sin/lc rurrenty"
(dl N.. t  56 of 24 rebruary 19971
Opinion of 29 May 1997 on 'Arangements  fol
srige thrce oferonomi and monetary union: sta-
biity and gJowth pact for ensuring  budgetdry
discioline, reinforced rcnafftmp Prorcdures, t  d
a new e*rhor[" ,ot" mechai;sn"  i'J1 Nu. (  28-
of22 Scprember  1997)
(lprnion  of l0 Decembcr l9a-  <-rrr rlr< ( unrnr.s
siirr Corrrmunitrri.'rr  "The impart  of the intn'
duction of the euro on capital marhets"  (CES
t408197)
61requested by the Commission,  the
Committee  is confining its comments
to aspects which call for future deci-
sions or initiatives and will leave an
appraisal of past or ongoing work until
a more suitable juncture.
2.  \il(ork programme3
2.1. The Commission  regards it as
"essential" that Member States, before
rhe end of 1997, presenr rheir own
action plans in connection with:
.  the transition  programme, including
statements on accounfl  ng, reportlng
and tax declarations in euro;
.  public issuers' intentions  on rede-
nomination of existing  debt';
.  the final design ofthe national faces
ot euro colns;
.  the launch of national communica-
tion campaigns;
.  narional positions on the tax conse-
quences of transition.
2.2. Lastly, the Commission wonders,
whether  national or Community  mea-
sures would be preferable on a number
of practical points; in the latter case, rhe
question is wherher to adopr legislarion
or to allow market self-regulation, pos-
siblv with rhe adootion oF codes of'
praitice. Here again, the study should
be complered  by the end ol 1997.
3.  Preparations  in progresst
3.1. (On rhe preparations  being made
by rhe national  pu-blic adminisrrition
(point 1.2 of the communication)).  The
Committee  observes that tangible
progress has been made on ... commu-
nication in almost all countries.  The
communication  mentions that, in line
with the "free option" principle, com-
panies must be able to choose whether
their transactions  are to be in euro or in
the nationd currency, at any stage dur-
ing the transition phase.
3.2. ln addition, the Committee
would draw the attention of the Com-
mission and the Member Stares to a
measure of inflexibility  in this rule: once
the transition has taken place, it becomes
irreversible. In other words, after opdnq
for the euro, the company will no fongEr
be able to revert to nitional  currency.
The new adoption programmes involved
could prove to have cena.in shortcomings
which will necessitate  complex, lenefii
recrification  procedures,  arid possibTy i
temporaDt rcturn to the old programmes.
The Commimee is thereFore opposed ro
irreversible options, which can impede
me Pfocess.
3.3. The Communication confirms
that ail national administrations will
retain national crrrency for their inter'
nal accounting  throughout the transi-
tion period. The Committee is pleased
to see thar the recommendarion it
made in 1995" has been acred upon.
The potential cost implicationJ for
administrations oF having ro accepr
euro payments from the [eneral public
(and presumably  having io m"k. .uro




See the communication's "executive summary"
See the Commission Communication  "The
impacr  ofrhe inrroduction  of rhe euro on capital
markets"  (COM(97) 337 firnl of 2 JuJy 1997)
Chapter I of the communication
Opinion of26 October 1995,  points 5.3.11. and
6.4.34.  Accounting and fiscal aspectsT
4.I.  Views differ on the investments
and expenditure  that will have to be
shouldired  bv comoanies for the transi-
tion to the .riro. Ti" Committee  has
already stated its opinion on this point',
ro the effect thaL market  rules should
facilitate fair apportionment of such
costs. In varioui Member  States the
trend would seem to be towards  a mea-
sure of fiscal flexibiliry taking account
of transition costs. This approach  is cer-
tainly feasible but the Committee
would warn aeainst discrepancies  in
treatment  b.tiueen the Member Srates
and. at national level, between the vari-
ous economic categories. The move to a
single currency mu"st not agqrauate  the
ta*ition  diffeiences  that aliiadv exist in
Europe.
5.  Practical as-pects of concern
to currency users'
5.1. The Committee  considers that
users should not have to bear any
chare.es For scriptural conversions aris-
ine fiom the mandatory conversion of
".ioun,, 
bv banks at the end o[ the
7.,
transitional  period and From the con-
version ofa credit transaction into the
currency  of the beneficiary account.
Banks irould also converi national cur-
rency in amounrs  usual for private
transactions  into euros at no charge. All
other scriotural and conversion  transac-
tions, and the transparent  identification
of potential  charges arisinq, should be
regulated by volu"ntary coJes of conduct
*iihi.t rhe i..tor. .on".rned. lt is rec-
ommended that consumers be provided
with additional information inihe form
of national euro-labels to identifv
charges properly levied.
5.1.1. On conversion charges (point
4.3 of the communication)  voluntary
aqreemenrs  or codes of practice should
b-e qiven prelerence ovei reqularion, but
tr"irp"r.tt.y  should be thJ rule in all
cases ofconversion, stating either that
the transaction is free of charge or indi-
cating the rates charged.
5.2. In the Committeet view, I Janu-
w  2002 should be retained as date for
thl first issue of euro notes and coins.
5.3. Dual display (point 4.2. of the
communication). In line with the sub-
sidiariry principle, the Member  States
should decide for themselves,  via legis-
lation, whether the dual display of
prices should be mandatory during the
io-."irt.n.. oeriod. or whether thE
business  circles concerning (particularly
the retail trade) should, through their
organizarion, make a voluntary  com-
-i",-..tt ro calculate and dispiay the
new orice correctlv at rhe set conversion
,"t. f.o- the .rlt-bff date. In addition,
retailers could be called upon to give
their customers everv possible assistance
in adjusting to the new euro currency
and its uaftie, for example, by providing
small pocket calculators on shopping
trolleys, conversion tables ofkey prices,
etc. During the preceding  period, the
Committee is opposed ro Communiry
legislarion,  which could well prove ill-
ad"apted to the differing national situa-
tions. Market lorces *6uld seem a more
aoorooriate means of bringing about
t|li 
"ioption 
ofdual displly, ivhere rhis




Point 3.2 of the communication
Opinion of 26 October 1995, points 6.2.4. to
6.2.7.
Chapter 4 of the communication5.3.1. kgislation or regulations  should
focus primarily on preventing  abuse of
consumer interests  possibly in the
shape of inaccurate conversion or
deliberate  misuse oF the "roundinq-
off" ru.les. The Commitree *ond.it
whether this aspect is to be studied in
greater  depth by the Commission  and
Member States. It is imoortant that the
consumer should be abli to check that
prices tally, but even more. important to
ensute tnat an exact eouatlon ts
required of sellers of gbods and ser-
vices. Offenders acting in bad faith. for
instance in cases of deliberate and sys-
tematic breaches of the rules, would be
guilry of the crime of fraud.
5.4. One aspect which the Commu-
nication  has not broached is the role of
payment or prepaid cards during the
transition period. In its Opinion on
the Creen  Paper, the Commirree point-
eq our rnar sucn means or Payment
incorporate - or will shorrlv do so - ele-
ments and/or details in microorocessor
cards so as Lo allow payment in one
currency or another and/or to convert
berween currencies. In the latter case,
there would be the additional  advan-
tage o[ an automatic  conversion check
on the prices indicated by sellers.
5,4.1. The Commirree suggesrs  rhar rhe
Com m ission study in greitir depth the
various asDects involved in the use of
cards so as to improve undersranding
and use wirh rhe'means at iLs disposil.
Here the market (and especially  con-
sumers) needs to be given zuarantees,
through the rapid solirion 6f .rtr.r,
which have been pending for some
time, (e.g. the recovery of costs borne
by card carriers).
5.5. Length of the co-existence peri-
od (Phase C). To avoid unnecessary
queues at bank counters on the first
days after introduction  ofeuro notes
and coins and to facilitate a calm,
orderly and cost-effective  conversion  of
nadonal currency into euro notes and
coins, Phase C must run for a certain
minimum oeriod. If Member  States
allow only I few days for conversion
from national currencies to the euro,
such undesirable  consequences  will be
unavoidable. Member  Siates should still
be empowered  to set the length of
Phase C under Article 15 ofthe Coun-
cil Resolution ol7lulv 1997 on the
leeal framework foi inlroduction  of the
.rr-ro, brt the Commission  is neverthe-
less urged to provide assistance to the
Member Srates in keeping  each other
informed  and in discussing  the lengrh
of Phase C.
6.  Communicationactivitiesro
6.1. The Committee takes note of
the action taken in this field by the
Commission  and rhe Member  States -
as well as by organizations  of economic
players and consumers - both with and
without Commission  funding. Howev-
er, from an initiai cursory appraisal of
the programmes,  two asPects would
seem to have been overlooked, or to
have received little atrention:
.  the fact that the euro will be leeal
tender aloneside national curreicies
for a certaii peiod. hence the call to
avoid needless  queues at bank
counters during the initial days of
conversion.  A smooth changeover -
as has always  been the c^. i"h.rt
nelv notes are substituted for notes
to be withdrawn from circulation -
10 Chapter 5 ofthe communicationis not iust an organizational matter;





the practical aspects of use of pay-
ment or prepaid cards (see point
5.5. above). Issuers oF payment
cards, preoaid cards and electronic
pursesare  required to provide obiec-
tive intormation  on the practical
aspecrs of using Lheir card systems.
Tire Commissi"on should piovide
additiond.  neutral informition
which does not gloss over possible
disadvantages.
Brussels, l1 December 1997.
The President
of the
Economic and Social Commitree
Tom Jenkins
7 ,  Financial markets"
7.1. The Committee  has stated its
position on this point in its Opinion on
the Commission  Communication  "The
impact of tbe introdaction  of tbe euro
on capital rnafhets'\'z.
1l  Chapter 7 ofthe communicarion
12 (Currendy in preparation)
The Secretary-General
of the
Economic  and Social Committee
Adriano GraziosiIn 1995, the Committee  issued an
Ooinion on the Green Pa\er on the
piactical  arrangement  for the introduc-
'ion 
of rhe sinile ,rrreicy (OJ C 39 of
12.0i.96) - ripporreuri: Mr Umberto
Burani (ltaly - Employers),
Mr Bernard  de Bigault du Granrut
(France - Various  Interests) and
Mr Michael Geuenich (Germany -
tVorkers).  As this is not a recent opln-
ion it is not reprinted in full in this
booklet. The obinion is, howevet
summarized  beiow.
Commission proposal
The Green Paper of 31 May does not
Dut forward a definitive scenario for
ihe introduction of the single curren-
cv. It simolv looks at the technical
"'nd 
l.g"l'"ip."ts in the light of a
three-stage  sequence.
I . Phase A: The European Council
decides to launch the single cur-
rency.
2. Phase B: Launch of Economic and
Monetary Union, with the
exchange  rates fixed irrevocably.
An incieasine  number of transac-
tions shouldf,e carried out in the
new currency (creation of a critical
mass, leading to a point of no
return).
3. Phase C: Final transition to the
single currency, which becomes
thJsole meani of payment.
Committee Opinion
Support for rhe Commission  move ro
impie*ent  and lacilitate transirion to
a single currency. Transirion should be
as speedy as possible, raking account
o[ the marketi capacity to adiust
smoothly to change, the need to min-
imize costs, and the extent to which
EM U is used to boosr job-creating
growth.
Pragmatic approach  ro pracrical prob-
1..!, dit..riu.t and regulations only
when strictly necessary.
Need for outline scenario so as to Pre-
dict the situation of countries  grantedexemption, indicating  what measures
will have to be taken to avoid mone-
tary disruption and particularly  the
emergence ofan unbridgeable  gulf
between these countries  and those
that have joined the single currency
system.
Need for stringent application, with
a political vision, of admissibiliry cri-
teria; political derogations only possi-
ble ifthey do not endanger the
furure stabiliry of the single currency.
Enhancement  of the role of the
European Central Bank.
Support for the "critical  mass" solu-
tion. The comDonents must be clear-
ly indicated and defined, without
repercussion  on the markets: the
banking sector should operate as an
interface berween  the national cur-
rency and single currency  as soon as
it is in a position to do so and pay-
ment systems have been adapted for
mat purpose.
Adoprion  of the single currcrcy may
disturb the financial, monetary and
securiries  markets. Regardless  of
assurances  to the contrafy - hopefully
warranted  - the authorides are
responsible for anticipating  possible
destabilizing  speculation  and deter-
mining the necessary  counter-mea-
SUTCS,
Acceptance of the possibility of a
gradual market transition  to the sin-
gle currency during  phase B, on con-
dition that this is entireiy volunrary
that decisions are taken in full
knowledge of the costs and benefits,
and that competition  is not unduly
distorted.
The costs of transition to the single
currency  should be borne and ap-por-
tioned according  to the rules of the
market, with intervention only when
really necessary.
Need to set up, as soon as possible, a
sound legal framework to underpin
the single currency.  In particulat the
non-reiegociability of iontracts and
the validiry of conversion  rates on
the securities and exchange  markets
(both European  and nonlEuropean)
must be guaranteed.
Fram i ng" oF effective legislation
agarnsr forging and using single cur-
rency banknores in the fight against
organ ized crime, including aJterna-
tlves or subs tutes tor money.
Recognition of the role of the public
authorities in transition to the single
currency, especially  with the issue 
-oF
government bonds immediately  after
the start of phase B. However,  care
should be taken during rhis phase, in
relarions with the market, to avoid
parrial or full change-over ro rhe sin-
gle currenry which can cause disrup-
iion. This ipplies particularly to the
tax authoriries and social securiry.
Consumer interests must be heeded
and protected  as part of the overall
policy of transition to the single cur-
rency. In particular:
The consumer must be made aware
of Europet aim in adopting a single
currency, the advantages he stands to
gain and the way the transition ro
the new currency will be organized.
Here a joint, coordinated drive,
involving the Commission,  the
Member States and companies,  in
particular  banks, will be ne..rsary.The consumer must be able to reap
the benefits of the single currency at
minimum cost. The Commission
and the Member States, though
refraining as far as possible from
imposing regulations, will have to
show great vigilance in ensuring  that
this condition is respected.
The consumer should be able to
familiarize himselFwith  use of the
single currency  even before it comes
into force and check that the conver-
sion rates are strictly applied. The
Commission and the consumer  asso-
ciations  have pinpointed one single
way of achieving this result: dual
indication of prices and charges on
bills, banking documents  and
payslips. Businesses  object that the
mandatory dual pricing requiremenr
can generate additional  costs, extra
paperwork and organizational com-
plications. \W'hile reserving the right
to return to this matter, the Commit-
ree cannot ignore the iustification, in
orinciple.  of such arguments. The
iorrrr,,-., rights reGired to above
must be orotected  but a balance has
to be found with the rest of the mar-
ket, including alternatives which
achieve the same results.
Effective  training, education and
communication  strategies  are needed.
In the case of training, responsibiliry
will devolve to the Commission,
Member States, sectoral organizations
and individual companies, in turn.
By ensuring  coordination,  duplica-
tion of tasls will be avoided.
Education must b€ provided in
schools of all levels and types, with
the single currency  taught as a specif-
rc suDrecr.
Communication strategy calls for a
separate, specialist study, enlisting all
available aids. However, as it is likely
to be extremely  expensive,  a careful
assessment  will be needed of the
potential  impact in relation to the
aids available.  The business sector -
especially banks - will play a key role
ln get ng the message across to con-





Lr ,rie  N,.,s [r ',  r,
el aie Il)let'./ Vtstiali.
Lucll!ct :i. )!!it',.i,






Asbl IEF:D / ORIZZ l'lTlEuropean  Communities  - Economic and Social Committee
THE EURO IN THE SPOTLIGHT
1998 - 7l Pages
ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR,IT, NL,PT FI, SV
Cataloeue  No. CES-98-006-ENEconomic and Social Committee
of the European Communities
D i rectorate fo r Co m m u n ico t ion s
Specialized Department  for Information and Visits
Rue Rovenstein 2  Tel.: 546 90 | | / 546 92 | 3
8J000 Brussels  Fax:546 98 22
Cotolooue Number:  ESC 98 006-EN